CVE-2026-102904 — JupyterLab: Argument injection in JupyterLab extension uninstall exposes server-readable files and internal URLs

Affected: jupyterlab

JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From JupyterLab 4.0.0 until 4.5.11 and 4.6.4, the PyPI Extension Manager uninstall request reaches ExtensionHandler.post, which validates extension names for installation but passes uninstall names to PyPIExtensionManager.uninstall and python -m pip uninstall without rejecting option-like values. The security impact requires that the PyPI Extension Manager is enabled, the account can call the extension API, and kernels and terminals are disabled or delegated to remote hosts; otherwise the user can already read files and make outbound requests directly. An authenticated user with extension API access can supply a pip requirements option to make the server read a local file or fetch an internal URL, and reflected parse errors can return the first unparsable line or response content. A pip log option can also create or corrupt a chosen path with pip-generated log text, but the requester cannot select an arbitrary disclosed line or arbitrary file content, and the injection does not add code execution or availability impact beyond ordinary package removal. This issue is fixed in JupyterLab 4.5.11 and 4.6.4.

GHSA-3325-v43h-43rv — JupyterLab: Argument injection in JupyterLab extension uninstall exposes server-readable files and internal URLs

Affected: PyPI: jupyterlab

JupyterLab's PyPI extension manager runs `python -m pip uninstall` with the extension name taken from the request body. `ExtensionHandler.post` validates the name for `cmd=install` but not for `cmd=uninstall`, so a name that begins with `-` reaches the command line and pip reads it as an option rather than as a package.

```python cmdline = [ sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "uninstall", "--yes", "--no-input", extension, ] ```

An extension name of the form `-r` followed by a path therefore made pip open that path as a requirements file. pip's parse error quotes the line it could not read and names the file it came from, and JupyterLab returned that error in the response body, so the line reached the requester.

This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:

- the (default) PyPI Extension Manager enabled, so that uninstall requests reach pip; - an authenticated account permitted to call the extension API; and - kernels and terminals disabled or delegated to remote hosts (otherwise a user with kernel access can read the same files and make the same outbound requests directly, regardless of this endpoint)

Unlike [GHSA-37w4-hwhx-4rc4](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-37w4-hwhx-4rc4) and [GHSA-89vp-jrxv-24w8](https://github.com/jupyterlab/jupyterlab/security/advisories/GHSA-89vp-jrxv-24w8), this does not need an allowlist or blocklist to be configured. The uninstall path never cons…

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CVE-2026-102904 — JupyterLab: Argument injection in JupyterLab extension uninstall exposes server-readable files and internal URLs

GHSA-3325-v43h-43rv — JupyterLab: Argument injection in JupyterLab extension uninstall exposes server-readable files and internal URLs