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      <title>CVE-2026-33032 — Nginx UI: Unauthenticated MCP Endpoint Allows Remote Nginx Takeover</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-33032</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; 0xJacky nginx-ui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. In versions 2.3.5 and prior, the nginx-ui MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration exposes two HTTP endpoints: /mcp and /mcp_message. While /mcp requires both IP whitelisting and authentication (AuthRequired() middleware), the /mcp_message endpoint only applies IP whitelisting - and the default IP whitelist is empty, which the middleware treats as &amp;#34;allow all&amp;#34;. This means any network attacker can invoke all MCP tools without authentication, including restarting nginx, creating/modifying/deleting nginx configuration files, and triggering automatic config reloads - achieving complete nginx service takeover. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; 0xJacky nginx-ui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. In versions 2.3.5 and prior, the nginx-ui MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration exposes two HTTP endpoints: /mcp and /mcp_message. While /mcp requires both IP whitelisting and authentication (AuthRequired() middleware), the /mcp_message endpoint only applies IP whitelisting - and the default IP whitelist is empty, which the middleware treats as &amp;#34;allow all&amp;#34;. This means any network attacker can invoke all MCP tools without authentication, including restarting nginx, creating/modifying/deleting nginx configuration files, and triggering automatic config reloads - achieving complete nginx service takeover. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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