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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:36:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64620 — FreeRDP before 3.28.0 Heap Buffer Overflow via crypto_rsa_common</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64620</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; FreeRDP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeRDP before 3.28.0 (affected &amp;lt;=3.27.1) contains a heap-based buffer overflow in crypto_rsa_common() (libfreerdp/crypto/crypto.c). The function writes the modular-exponentiation result into the caller&amp;#39;s output buffer via BN_bn2bin() and only afterward checks output_length &amp;gt; out_length, so out-of-bounds bytes are written before the bounds check. On the server side, when a client selects RDP Standard Security, the encrypted client random is decrypted into a fixed 32-byte buffer. Because the server publishes its RSA public key, an unauthenticated attacker can forge a ciphertext whose decrypted value is up to the full modulus length (e.g. 256 bytes for RSA-2048), overflowing the 32-byte heap buffer by up to ~224 attacker-controlled bytes pre-authentication, resulting in denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; FreeRDP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeRDP before 3.28.0 (affected &amp;lt;=3.27.1) contains a heap-based buffer overflow in crypto_rsa_common() (libfreerdp/crypto/crypto.c). The function writes the modular-exponentiation result into the caller&amp;#39;s output buffer via BN_bn2bin() and only afterward checks output_length &amp;gt; out_length, so out-of-bounds bytes are written before the bounds check. On the server side, when a client selects RDP Standard Security, the encrypted client random is decrypted into a fixed 32-byte buffer. Because the server publishes its RSA public key, an unauthenticated attacker can forge a ciphertext whose decrypted value is up to the full modulus length (e.g. 256 bytes for RSA-2048), overflowing the 32-byte heap buffer by up to ~224 attacker-controlled bytes pre-authentication, resulting in denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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