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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 22:38:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31700 — net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31700</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap&amp;#39;d vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap&amp;#39;d TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap&amp;#39;d ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap&amp;#39;d vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap&amp;#39;d TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap&amp;#39;d ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31700</guid>
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