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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 23:23:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-46253 — pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46253</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same
persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -&amp;gt; ramoops_get_next_prz
for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, the function only allocates prz-&amp;gt;old_log when it is NULL,
but it unconditionally updates prz-&amp;gt;old_log_size to the current buffer
size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the
buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen
across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls
2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer
   using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The KASAN splat would look similar to:
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
  Read of size N at addr ... by task ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes.
  1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash,
     allocates old_log with size X
  2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms &amp;gt;= 0)
  3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues)
  4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (&amp;gt;X)
  5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called
  6. System continues running (not a panic oops)
  7. Timer fires af…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same
persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -&amp;gt; ramoops_get_next_prz
for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, the function only allocates prz-&amp;gt;old_log when it is NULL,
but it unconditionally updates prz-&amp;gt;old_log_size to the current buffer
size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the
buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen
across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls
2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer
   using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The KASAN splat would look similar to:
  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x...
  Read of size N at addr ... by task ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes.
  1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash,
     allocates old_log with size X
  2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms &amp;gt;= 0)
  3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues)
  4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (&amp;gt;X)
  5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called
  6. System continues running (not a panic oops)
  7. Timer fires af…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46253</guid>
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