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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 23:15:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31476 — ksmbd: do not expire session on binding failure</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31476</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: do not expire session on binding failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a multichannel session binding request fails (e.g. wrong password),
the error path unconditionally sets sess-&amp;gt;state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED.
However, during binding, sess points to the target session looked up via
ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() -- which belongs to another connection&amp;#39;s
user. This allows a remote attacker to invalidate any active session by
simply sending a binding request with a wrong password (DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by skipping session expiration when the failed request was
a binding attempt, since the session does not belong to the current
connection. The reference taken by ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() is
still correctly released via ksmbd_user_session_put().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: do not expire session on binding failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a multichannel session binding request fails (e.g. wrong password),
the error path unconditionally sets sess-&amp;gt;state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED.
However, during binding, sess points to the target session looked up via
ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() -- which belongs to another connection&amp;#39;s
user. This allows a remote attacker to invalidate any active session by
simply sending a binding request with a wrong password (DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by skipping session expiration when the failed request was
a binding attempt, since the session does not belong to the current
connection. The reference taken by ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() is
still correctly released via ksmbd_user_session_put().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31476</guid>
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