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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 19:44:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31641 — rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31641</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length
from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4)
before using the rounded value for validation and allocation.  When the raw
length is &amp;gt;= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and
kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original
~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an
unprivileged add_key() call.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket
     lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with
     the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key
     length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and
     memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of
     TOCTOU re-parse.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length
from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4)
before using the rounded value for validation and allocation.  When the raw
length is &amp;gt;= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and
kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original
~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an
unprivileged add_key() call.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket
     lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with
     the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key
     length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and
     memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of
     TOCTOU re-parse.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31641</guid>
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