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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 19:50:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53266 — netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53266</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite
behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0).  This is intentional: at the bridge
ebtables hooks the Ethernet header is addressed through
skb_mac_header()/eth_hdr(), while skb-&amp;gt;data points at the Ethernet
payload.  Asking skb_ensure_writable() for ETH_HLEN bytes would check
the payload, not the Ethernet header, and would reintroduce the small
packet regression fixed by commit 63137bc5882a.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the optional ARP sender hardware address rewrite is different.
It writes through skb_store_bits() at an offset relative to skb-&amp;gt;data:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb_store_bits(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr), info-&amp;gt;mac, ETH_ALEN)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb_header_pointer() only safely reads the ARP header; it does not make
the later sender hardware address range writable.  If that range is
still held in a nonlinear skb fragment backed by a splice-imported file
page, skb_store_bits() maps the frag page and copies the new MAC address
directly into it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ensure the ARP SHA range is writable before reading the ARP header and
before calling skb_store_bits().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite
behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0).  This is intentional: at the bridge
ebtables hooks the Ethernet header is addressed through
skb_mac_header()/eth_hdr(), while skb-&amp;gt;data points at the Ethernet
payload.  Asking skb_ensure_writable() for ETH_HLEN bytes would check
the payload, not the Ethernet header, and would reintroduce the small
packet regression fixed by commit 63137bc5882a.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the optional ARP sender hardware address rewrite is different.
It writes through skb_store_bits() at an offset relative to skb-&amp;gt;data:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb_store_bits(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr), info-&amp;gt;mac, ETH_ALEN)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;skb_header_pointer() only safely reads the ARP header; it does not make
the later sender hardware address range writable.  If that range is
still held in a nonlinear skb fragment backed by a splice-imported file
page, skb_store_bits() maps the frag page and copies the new MAC address
directly into it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ensure the ARP SHA range is writable before reading the ARP header and
before calling skb_store_bits().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53266</guid>
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