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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 11:04:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-46209 — drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46209</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() computes sub-sampled plane dimensions
using plain integer division:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned int width  = mode_cmd-&amp;gt;width  / (i ? info-&amp;gt;hsub : 1);
  unsigned int height = mode_cmd-&amp;gt;height / (i ? info-&amp;gt;vsub : 1);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the ioctl-level framebuffer_check() in drm_framebuffer.c uses
drm_format_info_plane_width/height() which round up dimensions via
DIV_ROUND_UP(). This inconsistency corrupts the subsequent GEM object
size check for certain pixel format and dimension combinations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, with NV12 (vsub=2) and a 1-pixel-tall framebuffer the
GEM size validation path sees height=0 instead of height=1. The
expression (height - 1) then wraps to UINT_MAX as an unsigned int,
causing min_size to overflow and wrap back to a small value. A tiny
GEM object therefore passes the size guard, yet when the GPU accesses
the chroma plane it will read or write memory beyond the object&amp;#39;s
bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by replacing the open-coded divisions with drm_format_info_plane_width()
and drm_format_info_plane_height(), which use DIV_ROUND_UP() and match
the calculation already used in framebuffer_check().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() computes sub-sampled plane dimensions
using plain integer division:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;unsigned int width  = mode_cmd-&amp;gt;width  / (i ? info-&amp;gt;hsub : 1);
  unsigned int height = mode_cmd-&amp;gt;height / (i ? info-&amp;gt;vsub : 1);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, the ioctl-level framebuffer_check() in drm_framebuffer.c uses
drm_format_info_plane_width/height() which round up dimensions via
DIV_ROUND_UP(). This inconsistency corrupts the subsequent GEM object
size check for certain pixel format and dimension combinations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, with NV12 (vsub=2) and a 1-pixel-tall framebuffer the
GEM size validation path sees height=0 instead of height=1. The
expression (height - 1) then wraps to UINT_MAX as an unsigned int,
causing min_size to overflow and wrap back to a small value. A tiny
GEM object therefore passes the size guard, yet when the GPU accesses
the chroma plane it will read or write memory beyond the object&amp;#39;s
bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by replacing the open-coded divisions with drm_format_info_plane_width()
and drm_format_info_plane_height(), which use DIV_ROUND_UP() and match
the calculation already used in framebuffer_check().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46209</guid>
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