<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 20:56:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2024-35871 — riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-35871</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-&amp;gt;gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[From the email thread]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
   register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
   sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
   zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a bug in its own right, but I&amp;#39;m unwilling to bet that it is the only
   way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
   before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
   happen at user/kernel boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is per…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs-&amp;gt;gp is never used since
the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
means.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[From the email thread]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
from userspace in at least five ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
   register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
   sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
   zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is a bug in its own right, but I&amp;#39;m unwilling to bet that it is the only
   way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
   before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
   happen at user/kernel boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is per…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-35871</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
