https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:41:25 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-42102 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>Revert &#34;mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again&#34;</p> <p>Patch series &#34;mm: Avoid possible overflows in dirty throttling&#34;.</p> <p>Dirty throttling logic assumes dirty limits in page units fit into 32-bits. This patch series makes sure this is true (see patch 2/2 for more details).</p> <p>This patch (of 2):</p> <p>This reverts commit 9319b647902cbd5cc884ac08a8a6d54ce111fc78.</p> <p>The commit is broken in several ways. Firstly, the removed (u64) cast from the multiplication will introduce a multiplication overflow on 32-bit archs if wb_thresh * bg_thresh &gt;= 1&lt;&lt;32 (which is actually common - the default settings with 4GB of RAM will trigger this). Secondly, the div64_u64() is unnecessarily expensive on 32-bit archs. We have div64_ul() in case we want to be safe &amp; cheap. Thirdly, if dirty thresholds are larger than 1&lt;&lt;32 pages, then dirty balancing is going to blow up in many other spectacular ways anyway so trying to fix one possible overflow is just moot.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>Revert &#34;mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again&#34;</p> <p>Patch series &#34;mm: Avoid possible overflows in dirty throttling&#34;.</p> <p>Dirty throttling logic assumes dirty limits in page units fit into 32-bits. This patch series makes sure this is true (see patch 2/2 for more details).</p> <p>This patch (of 2):</p> <p>This reverts commit 9319b647902cbd5cc884ac08a8a6d54ce111fc78.</p> <p>The commit is broken in several ways. Firstly, the removed (u64) cast from the multiplication will introduce a multiplication overflow on 32-bit archs if wb_thresh * bg_thresh &gt;= 1&lt;&lt;32 (which is actually common - the default settings with 4GB of RAM will trigger this). Secondly, the div64_u64() is unnecessarily expensive on 32-bit archs. We have div64_ul() in case we want to be safe &amp; cheap. Thirdly, if dirty thresholds are larger than 1&lt;&lt;32 pages, then dirty balancing is going to blow up in many other spectacular ways anyway so trying to fix one possible overflow is just moot.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-42102