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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:30:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2024-43882 — exec: Fix ToCToU between perm check and set-uid/gid usage</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-43882</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens RUGGEDCOM RST2428P, Siemens SCALANCE XC-300/XR-300/XC-400/XR-500WG/XR-500 family, Siemens SCALANCE XCM-/XRM-/XCH-/XRH-300 family, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP - GNU/Linux subsystem&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exec: Fix ToCToU between perm check and set-uid/gid usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When opening a file for exec via do_filp_open(), permission checking is
done against the file&amp;#39;s metadata at that moment, and on success, a file
pointer is passed back. Much later in the execve() code path, the file
metadata (specifically mode, uid, and gid) is used to determine if/how
to set the uid and gid. However, those values may have changed since the
permissions check, meaning the execution may gain unintended privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, if a file could change permissions from executable and not
set-id:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---------x 1 root root 16048 Aug  7 13:16 target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;to set-id and non-executable:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---S------ 1 root root 16048 Aug  7 13:16 target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;it is possible to gain root privileges when execution should have been
disallowed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While this race condition is rare in real-world scenarios, it has been
observed (and proven exploitable) when package managers are updating
the setuid bits of installed programs. Such files start with being
world-executable but then are adjusted to be group-exec with a set-uid
bit. For example, &amp;#34;chmod o-x,u+s target&amp;#34; makes &amp;#34;target&amp;#34; executable only
by uid &amp;#34;root&amp;#34; and gid &amp;#34;cdrom&amp;#34;, while also becoming setuid-root:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-rwxr-xr-x 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug  7 13:16 target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;becomes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-rwsr-xr-- 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug  7 13:16 target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But racing the chmod means users without group &amp;#34;cdrom&amp;#34; membership can
get the permission to execute &amp;#34;target&amp;#34; just b…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux, Siemens RUGGEDCOM RST2428P, Siemens SCALANCE XC-300/XR-300/XC-400/XR-500WG/XR-500 family, Siemens SCALANCE XCM-/XRM-/XCH-/XRH-300 family, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP - GNU/Linux subsystem&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exec: Fix ToCToU between perm check and set-uid/gid usage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When opening a file for exec via do_filp_open(), permission checking is
done against the file&amp;#39;s metadata at that moment, and on success, a file
pointer is passed back. Much later in the execve() code path, the file
metadata (specifically mode, uid, and gid) is used to determine if/how
to set the uid and gid. However, those values may have changed since the
permissions check, meaning the execution may gain unintended privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For example, if a file could change permissions from executable and not
set-id:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---------x 1 root root 16048 Aug  7 13:16 target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;to set-id and non-executable:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---S------ 1 root root 16048 Aug  7 13:16 target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;it is possible to gain root privileges when execution should have been
disallowed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While this race condition is rare in real-world scenarios, it has been
observed (and proven exploitable) when package managers are updating
the setuid bits of installed programs. Such files start with being
world-executable but then are adjusted to be group-exec with a set-uid
bit. For example, &amp;#34;chmod o-x,u+s target&amp;#34; makes &amp;#34;target&amp;#34; executable only
by uid &amp;#34;root&amp;#34; and gid &amp;#34;cdrom&amp;#34;, while also becoming setuid-root:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-rwxr-xr-x 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug  7 13:16 target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;becomes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-rwsr-xr-- 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug  7 13:16 target&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But racing the chmod means users without group &amp;#34;cdrom&amp;#34; membership can
get the permission to execute &amp;#34;target&amp;#34; just b…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-43882</guid>
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