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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 04:35:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2024-47740 — f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-47740</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for
inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or
Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller&amp;#39;s FSUID
matches the inode&amp;#39;s UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write
particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this
can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can
   truncate an inode to size 0
 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert
   changes another process concurrently made to a file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for
F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these
ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break
anything.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for
inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or
Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller&amp;#39;s FSUID
matches the inode&amp;#39;s UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write
particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this
can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can
   truncate an inode to size 0
 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert
   changes another process concurrently made to a file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for
F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these
ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break
anything.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-47740</guid>
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