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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 03:43:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2024-56555 — binder: fix OOB in binder_add_freeze_work()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-56555</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binder: fix OOB in binder_add_freeze_work()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc-&amp;gt;nodes with the
proc-&amp;gt;inner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped to
acquire the node-&amp;gt;lock first (lock nesting order). This can race with
binder_deferred_release() which removes the nodes from the proc-&amp;gt;nodes
rbtree and adds them into binder_dead_nodes list. This leads to a broken
iteration in binder_add_freeze_work() as rb_next() will use data from
binder_dead_nodes, triggering an out-of-bounds access:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in rb_next+0xfc/0x124
  Read of size 8 at addr ffffcb84285f7170 by task freeze/660&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 660 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #18
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   rb_next+0xfc/0x124
   binder_add_freeze_work+0x344/0x534
   binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buggy address belongs to the variable:
   binder_dead_nodes+0x10/0x40
  [...]
  ==================================================================&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is possible because proc-&amp;gt;nodes (rbtree) and binder_dead_nodes
(list) share entries in binder_node through a union:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct binder_node {
	[...]
		union {
			struct rb_node rb_node;
			struct hlist_node dead_node;
		};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the race by checking that the proc is still alive. If not, simply
break out of…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binder: fix OOB in binder_add_freeze_work()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc-&amp;gt;nodes with the
proc-&amp;gt;inner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped to
acquire the node-&amp;gt;lock first (lock nesting order). This can race with
binder_deferred_release() which removes the nodes from the proc-&amp;gt;nodes
rbtree and adds them into binder_dead_nodes list. This leads to a broken
iteration in binder_add_freeze_work() as rb_next() will use data from
binder_dead_nodes, triggering an out-of-bounds access:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in rb_next+0xfc/0x124
  Read of size 8 at addr ffffcb84285f7170 by task freeze/660&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 660 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #18
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   rb_next+0xfc/0x124
   binder_add_freeze_work+0x344/0x534
   binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac
   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buggy address belongs to the variable:
   binder_dead_nodes+0x10/0x40
  [...]
  ==================================================================&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is possible because proc-&amp;gt;nodes (rbtree) and binder_dead_nodes
(list) share entries in binder_node through a union:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct binder_node {
	[...]
		union {
			struct rb_node rb_node;
			struct hlist_node dead_node;
		};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix the race by checking that the proc is still alive. If not, simply
break out of…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-56555</guid>
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