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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 21:22:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2025-40043 — net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-40043</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syzbot reported an uninitialized value bug in nci_init_req, which was
introduced by commit 5aca7966d2a7 (&amp;#34;Merge tag
&amp;#39;perf-tools-fixes-for-v6.17-2025-09-16&amp;#39; of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug arises due to very limited and poor input validation
that was done at nic_valid_size(). This validation only
validates the skb-&amp;gt;len (directly reflects size provided at the
userspace interface) with the length provided in the buffer
itself (interpreted as NCI_HEADER). This leads to the processing
of memory content at the address assuming the correct layout
per what opcode requires there. This leads to the accesses to
buffer of `skb_buff-&amp;gt;data` which is not assigned anything yet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Following the same silent drop of packets of invalid sizes at
`nic_valid_size()`, add validation of the data in the respective
handlers and return error values in case of failure. Release
the skb if error values are returned from handlers in
`nci_nft_packet` and effectively do a silent drop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Possible TODO: because we silently drop the packets, the
call to `nci_request` will be waiting for completion of request
and will face timeouts. These timeouts can get excessively logged
in the dmesg. A proper handling of them may require to export
`nci_request_cancel` (or propagate error handling from the
nft packets handlers).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syzbot reported an uninitialized value bug in nci_init_req, which was
introduced by commit 5aca7966d2a7 (&amp;#34;Merge tag
&amp;#39;perf-tools-fixes-for-v6.17-2025-09-16&amp;#39; of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug arises due to very limited and poor input validation
that was done at nic_valid_size(). This validation only
validates the skb-&amp;gt;len (directly reflects size provided at the
userspace interface) with the length provided in the buffer
itself (interpreted as NCI_HEADER). This leads to the processing
of memory content at the address assuming the correct layout
per what opcode requires there. This leads to the accesses to
buffer of `skb_buff-&amp;gt;data` which is not assigned anything yet.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Following the same silent drop of packets of invalid sizes at
`nic_valid_size()`, add validation of the data in the respective
handlers and return error values in case of failure. Release
the skb if error values are returned from handlers in
`nci_nft_packet` and effectively do a silent drop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Possible TODO: because we silently drop the packets, the
call to `nci_request` will be waiting for completion of request
and will face timeouts. These timeouts can get excessively logged
in the dmesg. A proper handling of them may require to export
`nci_request_cancel` (or propagate error handling from the
nft packets handlers).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-40043</guid>
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