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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 19:47:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2025-68263 — ksmbd: ipc: fix use-after-free in ipc_msg_send_request</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-68263</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: ipc: fix use-after-free in ipc_msg_send_request&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipc_msg_send_request() waits for a generic netlink reply using an
ipc_msg_table_entry on the stack. The generic netlink handler
(handle_generic_event()/handle_response()) fills entry-&amp;gt;response under
ipc_msg_table_lock, but ipc_msg_send_request() used to validate and free
entry-&amp;gt;response without holding the same lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under high concurrency this allows a race where handle_response() is
copying data into entry-&amp;gt;response while ipc_msg_send_request() has just
freed it, leading to a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN in
handle_generic_event():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in handle_generic_event+0x3c4/0x5f0 [ksmbd]
  Write of size 12 at addr ffff888198ee6e20 by task pool/109349
  ...
  Freed by task:
    kvfree
    ipc_msg_send_request [ksmbd]
    ksmbd_rpc_open -&amp;gt; ksmbd_session_rpc_open [ksmbd]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by:
- Taking ipc_msg_table_lock in ipc_msg_send_request() while validating
  entry-&amp;gt;response, freeing it when invalid, and removing the entry from
  ipc_msg_table.
- Returning the final entry-&amp;gt;response pointer to the caller only after
  the hash entry is removed under the lock.
- Returning NULL in the error path, preserving the original API
  semantics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This makes all accesses to entry-&amp;gt;response consistent with
handle_response(), which already updates and fills the response buffer
under ipc_msg_table_lock, and closes the race that allowed the UAF.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: ipc: fix use-after-free in ipc_msg_send_request&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ipc_msg_send_request() waits for a generic netlink reply using an
ipc_msg_table_entry on the stack. The generic netlink handler
(handle_generic_event()/handle_response()) fills entry-&amp;gt;response under
ipc_msg_table_lock, but ipc_msg_send_request() used to validate and free
entry-&amp;gt;response without holding the same lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under high concurrency this allows a race where handle_response() is
copying data into entry-&amp;gt;response while ipc_msg_send_request() has just
freed it, leading to a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN in
handle_generic_event():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in handle_generic_event+0x3c4/0x5f0 [ksmbd]
  Write of size 12 at addr ffff888198ee6e20 by task pool/109349
  ...
  Freed by task:
    kvfree
    ipc_msg_send_request [ksmbd]
    ksmbd_rpc_open -&amp;gt; ksmbd_session_rpc_open [ksmbd]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix by:
- Taking ipc_msg_table_lock in ipc_msg_send_request() while validating
  entry-&amp;gt;response, freeing it when invalid, and removing the entry from
  ipc_msg_table.
- Returning the final entry-&amp;gt;response pointer to the caller only after
  the hash entry is removed under the lock.
- Returning NULL in the error path, preserving the original API
  semantics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This makes all accesses to entry-&amp;gt;response consistent with
handle_response(), which already updates and fills the response buffer
under ipc_msg_table_lock, and closes the race that allowed the UAF.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-68263</guid>
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