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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:26:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-31525 — bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31525</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BPF interpreter&amp;#39;s signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use
the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation
(include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when
the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000),
abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged
on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as
0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The verifier&amp;#39;s abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes
the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a
verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds
map value access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32
before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8
abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter&amp;#39;s sdiv32/smod32 handlers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do
not use abs().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix undefined behavior in interpreter sdiv/smod for INT_MIN&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The BPF interpreter&amp;#39;s signed 32-bit division and modulo handlers use
the kernel abs() macro on s32 operands. The abs() macro documentation
(include/linux/math.h) explicitly states the result is undefined when
the input is the type minimum. When DST contains S32_MIN (0x80000000),
abs((s32)DST) triggers undefined behavior and returns S32_MIN unchanged
on arm64/x86. This value is then sign-extended to u64 as
0xFFFFFFFF80000000, causing do_div() to compute the wrong result.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The verifier&amp;#39;s abstract interpretation (scalar32_min_max_sdiv) computes
the mathematically correct result for range tracking, creating a
verifier/interpreter mismatch that can be exploited for out-of-bounds
map value access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Introduce abs_s32() which handles S32_MIN correctly by casting to u32
before negating, avoiding signed overflow entirely. Replace all 8
abs((s32)...) call sites in the interpreter&amp;#39;s sdiv32/smod32 handlers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;s32 is the only affected case -- the s64 division/modulo handlers do
not use abs().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31525</guid>
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