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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:53:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31596 — ocfs2: handle invalid dinode in ocfs2_group_extend</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31596</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2: handle invalid dinode in ocfs2_group_extend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[BUG]
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_group_extend+0x10aa/0x1ae0 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308
Code: 8b8520ff ffff83f8 860f8580 030000e8 5cc3c1fe
Call Trace:
 ...
 ocfs2_ioctl+0x175/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:869
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
 x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[CAUSE]
ocfs2_group_extend() assumes that the global bitmap inode block
returned from ocfs2_inode_lock() has already been validated and
BUG_ONs when the signature is not a dinode. That assumption is too
strong for crafted filesystems because the JBD2-managed buffer path
can bypass structural validation and return an invalid dinode to the
resize ioctl.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[FIX]
Validate the dinode explicitly in ocfs2_group_extend(). If the global
bitmap buffer does not contain a valid dinode, report filesystem
corruption with ocfs2_error() and fail the resize operation instead of
crashing the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ocfs2: handle invalid dinode in ocfs2_group_extend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[BUG]
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_group_extend+0x10aa/0x1ae0 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308
Code: 8b8520ff ffff83f8 860f8580 030000e8 5cc3c1fe
Call Trace:
 ...
 ocfs2_ioctl+0x175/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:869
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
 x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 ...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[CAUSE]
ocfs2_group_extend() assumes that the global bitmap inode block
returned from ocfs2_inode_lock() has already been validated and
BUG_ONs when the signature is not a dinode. That assumption is too
strong for crafted filesystems because the JBD2-managed buffer path
can bypass structural validation and return an invalid dinode to the
resize ioctl.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[FIX]
Validate the dinode explicitly in ocfs2_group_extend(). If the global
bitmap buffer does not contain a valid dinode, report filesystem
corruption with ocfs2_error() and fail the resize operation instead of
crashing the kernel.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-31596</guid>
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