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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 19:53:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-45949 — hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45949</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, hwrng_fill is not cleared until the hwrng_fillfn() thread
exits. Since hwrng_unregister() reads hwrng_fill outside the rng_mutex
lock, a concurrent hwrng_unregister() may call kthread_stop() again on
the same task.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, if hwrng_unregister() is called immediately after
hwrng_register(), the stopped thread may have never been executed. Thus,
hwrng_fill remains dirty even after hwrng_unregister() returns. In this
case, subsequent calls to hwrng_register() will fail to start new
threads, and hwrng_unregister() will call kthread_stop() on the same
freed task. In both cases, a use-after-free occurs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: ... at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xec/0x1c0
Call Trace:
 kthread_stop+0x181/0x360
 hwrng_unregister+0x288/0x380
 virtrng_remove+0xe3/0x200&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch fixes the race by protecting the global hwrng_fill pointer
inside the rng_mutex lock, so that hwrng_fillfn() thread is stopped only
once, and calls to kthread_run() and kthread_stop() are serialized
with the lock held.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To avoid deadlock in hwrng_fillfn() while being stopped with the lock
held, we convert current_rng to RCU, so that get_current_rng() can read
current_rng without holding the lock. To remove the lock from put_rng(),
we also delay the actual cleanup into a work_struct.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since get_current_rng() no longer retu…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently, hwrng_fill is not cleared until the hwrng_fillfn() thread
exits. Since hwrng_unregister() reads hwrng_fill outside the rng_mutex
lock, a concurrent hwrng_unregister() may call kthread_stop() again on
the same task.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, if hwrng_unregister() is called immediately after
hwrng_register(), the stopped thread may have never been executed. Thus,
hwrng_fill remains dirty even after hwrng_unregister() returns. In this
case, subsequent calls to hwrng_register() will fail to start new
threads, and hwrng_unregister() will call kthread_stop() on the same
freed task. In both cases, a use-after-free occurs:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: ... at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xec/0x1c0
Call Trace:
 kthread_stop+0x181/0x360
 hwrng_unregister+0x288/0x380
 virtrng_remove+0xe3/0x200&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch fixes the race by protecting the global hwrng_fill pointer
inside the rng_mutex lock, so that hwrng_fillfn() thread is stopped only
once, and calls to kthread_run() and kthread_stop() are serialized
with the lock held.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To avoid deadlock in hwrng_fillfn() while being stopped with the lock
held, we convert current_rng to RCU, so that get_current_rng() can read
current_rng without holding the lock. To remove the lock from put_rng(),
we also delay the actual cleanup into a work_struct.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since get_current_rng() no longer retu…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45949</guid>
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