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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 23:55:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-46088 — ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46088</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names
buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items
remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0
error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE&amp;#39;s fortified strnlen() first checks
maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track
of p&amp;#39;s object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic
before the return value is examined.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified
strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names
buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items
remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0
error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE&amp;#39;s fortified strnlen() first checks
maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track
of p&amp;#39;s object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic
before the return value is examined.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified
strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46088</guid>
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