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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 15:31:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-46151 — usb: usblp: fix heap leak in IEEE 1284 device ID via short response</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46151</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: usblp: fix heap leak in IEEE 1284 device ID via short response&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usblp_ctrl_msg() collapses the usb_control_msg() return value to
0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred.  A broken
printer can complete the GET_DEVICE_ID control transfer short and the
driver has no way to know.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usblp_cache_device_id_string() reads the 2-byte big-endian length prefix
from the response and trusts it (clamped only to the buffer bounds).
The buffer is kmalloc(1024) at probe time. A device that sends exactly
two bytes (e.g. 0x03 0xFF, claiming a 1023-byte ID) leaves
device_id_string[2..1022] holding stale kmalloc heap.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That stale data is then exposed:
  - via the ieee1284_id sysfs attribute (sprintf(&amp;#34;%s&amp;#34;, buf+2), truncated
    at the first NUL in the stale heap), and
  - via the IOCNR_GET_DEVICE_ID ioctl, which copy_to_user()s the full
    claimed length regardless of NULs, up to 1021 bytes of uninitialized
    heap, with the leak size chosen by the device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this up by just zapping the buffer with zeros before each request
sent to the device.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb: usblp: fix heap leak in IEEE 1284 device ID via short response&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usblp_ctrl_msg() collapses the usb_control_msg() return value to
0/-errno, discarding the actual number of bytes transferred.  A broken
printer can complete the GET_DEVICE_ID control transfer short and the
driver has no way to know.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usblp_cache_device_id_string() reads the 2-byte big-endian length prefix
from the response and trusts it (clamped only to the buffer bounds).
The buffer is kmalloc(1024) at probe time. A device that sends exactly
two bytes (e.g. 0x03 0xFF, claiming a 1023-byte ID) leaves
device_id_string[2..1022] holding stale kmalloc heap.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That stale data is then exposed:
  - via the ieee1284_id sysfs attribute (sprintf(&amp;#34;%s&amp;#34;, buf+2), truncated
    at the first NUL in the stale heap), and
  - via the IOCNR_GET_DEVICE_ID ioctl, which copy_to_user()s the full
    claimed length regardless of NULs, up to 1021 bytes of uninitialized
    heap, with the leak size chosen by the device.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this up by just zapping the buffer with zeros before each request
sent to the device.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-46151</guid>
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