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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 18:34:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-63915 — nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63915</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() read
packet-&amp;gt;header from skb-&amp;gt;data at function entry without first checking
that the buffer holds at least one byte. A malicious NFC peer can send
a 0-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches
these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read of packet-&amp;gt;header.
The same 0-byte frame, if queued as a non-final fragment, also causes
the reassembly loop to underflow msg_len to UINT_MAX, triggering
skb_over_panic() when the reassembled skb is written.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by adding a pskb_may_pull() check at the entry of each
function before packet-&amp;gt;header is first accessed. The existing
pskb_may_pull() checks before the reassembled hcp_skb is cast to
struct hcp_packet remain in place to guard the 2-byte HCP message
header.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nfc: hci: fix out-of-bounds read in HCP header parsing&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both nfc_hci_recv_from_llc() and nci_hci_data_received_cb() read
packet-&amp;gt;header from skb-&amp;gt;data at function entry without first checking
that the buffer holds at least one byte. A malicious NFC peer can send
a 0-byte HCP frame that passes through the SHDLC layer and reaches
these functions, causing an out-of-bounds heap read of packet-&amp;gt;header.
The same 0-byte frame, if queued as a non-final fragment, also causes
the reassembly loop to underflow msg_len to UINT_MAX, triggering
skb_over_panic() when the reassembled skb is written.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by adding a pskb_may_pull() check at the entry of each
function before packet-&amp;gt;header is first accessed. The existing
pskb_may_pull() checks before the reassembled hcp_skb is cast to
struct hcp_packet remain in place to guard the 2-byte HCP message
header.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63915</guid>
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