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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 16:31:16 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-63976 — Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan-&gt;ident on ECRED reconfiguration success</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63976</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan-&amp;gt;ident on ECRED reconfiguration success&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing
chan-&amp;gt;ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp,
l2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan-&amp;gt;ident after a
successful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent
responses with the recycled ident value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can
replay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to
match and destroy the already-established channel via
l2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clear chan-&amp;gt;ident for all matching channels on success, and harden the
failure path by using l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() consistent with
other L2CAP handlers (l2cap_le_command_rej, __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan-&amp;gt;ident on ECRED reconfiguration success&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing
chan-&amp;gt;ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp,
l2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan-&amp;gt;ident after a
successful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent
responses with the recycled ident value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can
replay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to
match and destroy the already-established channel via
l2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clear chan-&amp;gt;ident for all matching channels on success, and harden the
failure path by using l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() consistent with
other L2CAP handlers (l2cap_le_command_rej, __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-63976</guid>
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