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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 02:49:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64309 — crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_COMMIT)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64309</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_COMMIT)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SNP_COMMIT command does not require the firmware to be in any
particular state. Skip initializing it if it was previously uninitialized.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SEV-SNP firmware specification doc 56860 does not mention SNP_COMMIT in
Table 5 as a command that is allowed in the UNINIT state, but it is in fact
allowed and a future documentation update will reflect that.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_COMMIT)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sashiko notes:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a
&amp;gt; userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g.,
&amp;gt; SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN
&amp;gt; execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the
&amp;gt; host?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SNP_COMMIT command does not require the firmware to be in any
particular state. Skip initializing it if it was previously uninitialized.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SEV-SNP firmware specification doc 56860 does not mention SNP_COMMIT in
Table 5 as a command that is allowed in the UNINIT state, but it is in fact
allowed and a future documentation update will reflect that.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64309</guid>
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