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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 23:32:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-64320 — nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64320</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment
of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo).  The 64-bit offset is then
added to a small kzalloc&amp;#39;d buffer that holds the discovery log page
and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which
memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound
check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u64 offset      = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req-&amp;gt;cmd);  /* 64-bit host */
    size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req-&amp;gt;cmd);     /* 32-bit host */
    ...
    if (offset &amp;amp; 0x3) { ... }                               /* only check */
    ...
    alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);
    buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed()
returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call
is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach
the nvmet target.  With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker
requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next
slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an
empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81
canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response).  Pointing the
offset at unmapped kern…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment
of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo).  The 64-bit offset is then
added to a small kzalloc&amp;#39;d buffer that holds the discovery log page
and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which
memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound
check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u64 offset      = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req-&amp;gt;cmd);  /* 64-bit host */
    size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req-&amp;gt;cmd);     /* 32-bit host */
    ...
    if (offset &amp;amp; 0x3) { ... }                               /* only check */
    ...
    alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);
    buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed()
returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call
is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach
the nvmet target.  With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker
requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next
slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an
empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81
canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response).  Pointing the
offset at unmapped kern…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64320</guid>
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