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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 11:16:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64398 — ksmbd: add a permission check for FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64398</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: add a permission check for FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA in smb2_ioctl() destroys file data via
ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() -&amp;gt; vfs_fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE/ZERO_RANGE) after
checking only the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE, with no
per-handle access check. A handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp (FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES is part of
FILE_WRITE_DESIRE_ACCESS_LE, so smb2_create_open_flags() opens it
O_WRONLY), so the vfs_fallocate FMODE_WRITE check does not stop it; only
the missing fp-&amp;gt;daccess gate would. Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 with
KASAN by an authenticated SMB client: a FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only handle
zeroed 4096 bytes of file data it had no FILE_WRITE_DATA right to
(6/6; a FILE_READ_DATA-only handle was correctly denied).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the unfixed sibling of commit cc57232cae23 (&amp;#34;ksmbd: fix FSCTL
permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE&amp;#34;).
Because SET_ZERO_DATA writes data (not an attribute), require
FILE_WRITE_DATA.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: add a permission check for FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA in smb2_ioctl() destroys file data via
ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() -&amp;gt; vfs_fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE/ZERO_RANGE) after
checking only the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE, with no
per-handle access check. A handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp (FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES is part of
FILE_WRITE_DESIRE_ACCESS_LE, so smb2_create_open_flags() opens it
O_WRONLY), so the vfs_fallocate FMODE_WRITE check does not stop it; only
the missing fp-&amp;gt;daccess gate would. Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 with
KASAN by an authenticated SMB client: a FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only handle
zeroed 4096 bytes of file data it had no FILE_WRITE_DATA right to
(6/6; a FILE_READ_DATA-only handle was correctly denied).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the unfixed sibling of commit cc57232cae23 (&amp;#34;ksmbd: fix FSCTL
permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE&amp;#34;).
Because SET_ZERO_DATA writes data (not an attribute), require
FILE_WRITE_DATA.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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