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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 19:56:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-68278 — drm/dp/mst: fix buffer overflows in sideband chunk accumulation</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68278</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/dp/mst: fix buffer overflows in sideband chunk accumulation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm_dp_sideband_append_payload() has three related bugs when processing
device-provided sideband reply data:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Zero-length curchunk_len underflow: msg_len is a 6-bit field taken
   directly from the DP sideband header. If a device sends msg_len=0,
   curchunk_len is set to zero. The condition (curchunk_idx &amp;gt;= curchunk_len)
   is immediately true, and curchunk_len-1 wraps to 255 (u8 underflow).
   drm_dp_msg_data_crc4() reads 255 bytes from chunk[48], then memcpy()
   writes 255 bytes into msg[], both far out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. chunk[48] overflow: curchunk_len can reach 63 (6-bit field). chunk[] is
   only 48 bytes. Multi-iteration payload assembly appends 16-byte blocks
   until curchunk_idx reaches curchunk_len, writing up to 15 bytes past
   the end of chunk[] into msg[].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. msg[256] overflow: each chunk contributes (curchunk_len-1) bytes to
   msg[]. No check ensures curlen + (curchunk_len-1) stays within msg[256],
   so the memcpy can spill into adjacent struct fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All three are reachable from any DP MST device that can forge sideband
reply messages on a physical connection.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/dp/mst: fix buffer overflows in sideband chunk accumulation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm_dp_sideband_append_payload() has three related bugs when processing
device-provided sideband reply data:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Zero-length curchunk_len underflow: msg_len is a 6-bit field taken
   directly from the DP sideband header. If a device sends msg_len=0,
   curchunk_len is set to zero. The condition (curchunk_idx &amp;gt;= curchunk_len)
   is immediately true, and curchunk_len-1 wraps to 255 (u8 underflow).
   drm_dp_msg_data_crc4() reads 255 bytes from chunk[48], then memcpy()
   writes 255 bytes into msg[], both far out of bounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. chunk[48] overflow: curchunk_len can reach 63 (6-bit field). chunk[] is
   only 48 bytes. Multi-iteration payload assembly appends 16-byte blocks
   until curchunk_idx reaches curchunk_len, writing up to 15 bytes past
   the end of chunk[] into msg[].&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. msg[256] overflow: each chunk contributes (curchunk_len-1) bytes to
   msg[]. No check ensures curlen + (curchunk_len-1) stays within msg[256],
   so the memcpy can spill into adjacent struct fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All three are reachable from any DP MST device that can forge sideband
reply messages on a physical connection.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-68278</guid>
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