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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 18:07:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-72068 — posix-cpu-timers: Use u64 multiplication in update_rlimit_cpu()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72068</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;posix-cpu-timers: Use u64 multiplication in update_rlimit_cpu()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;update_rlimit_cpu() converts the RLIMIT_CPU value to nanoseconds with&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u64 nsecs = rlim_new * NSEC_PER_SEC;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 32-bit kernels both rlim_new (unsigned long) and NSEC_PER_SEC
(1000000000L) are 32-bit, so the multiplication is performed in unsigned
long and truncated for rlim_new &amp;gt; 4 seconds before being widened to u64.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same file already casts to u64 for the matching computation in
check_process_timers():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u64 softns = (u64)soft * NSEC_PER_SEC;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, the truncated value is installed into the CPUCLOCK_PROF
expiry cache (nextevt), causing the process CPU timer to be programmed
to fire prematurely for any RLIMIT_CPU soft limit &amp;gt;= 5 seconds. The
actual SIGXCPU/SIGKILL decision in check_process_timers() already casts
to u64 and is therefore correct, so limit enforcement is not broken;
only the expiry-cache programming is wrong. Apply the same cast here so
both paths convert rlim_cur identically.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;64-bit kernels are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;posix-cpu-timers: Use u64 multiplication in update_rlimit_cpu()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;update_rlimit_cpu() converts the RLIMIT_CPU value to nanoseconds with&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u64 nsecs = rlim_new * NSEC_PER_SEC;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 32-bit kernels both rlim_new (unsigned long) and NSEC_PER_SEC
(1000000000L) are 32-bit, so the multiplication is performed in unsigned
long and truncated for rlim_new &amp;gt; 4 seconds before being widened to u64.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same file already casts to u64 for the matching computation in
check_process_timers():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;u64 softns = (u64)soft * NSEC_PER_SEC;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, the truncated value is installed into the CPUCLOCK_PROF
expiry cache (nextevt), causing the process CPU timer to be programmed
to fire prematurely for any RLIMIT_CPU soft limit &amp;gt;= 5 seconds. The
actual SIGXCPU/SIGKILL decision in check_process_timers() already casts
to u64 and is therefore correct, so limit enforcement is not broken;
only the expiry-cache programming is wrong. Apply the same cast here so
both paths convert rlim_cur identically.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;64-bit kernels are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72068</guid>
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