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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 18:06:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-72091 — accel/amdxdna: reject user command submission without a command BO</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72091</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;accel/amdxdna: reject user command submission without a command BO&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;amdxdna_drm_submit_execbuf() passes the user-supplied command BO handle
straight into amdxdna_cmd_submit() with drv_cmd == NULL. When the handle
is AMDXDNA_INVALID_BO_HANDLE (0), the block that fetches job-&amp;gt;cmd_bo is
skipped, leaving it NULL, and no check rejects it on the user path (the
!job-&amp;gt;cmd_bo guard lives inside the != INVALID branch).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The job is then armed and pushed to the DRM scheduler.
aie2_sched_job_run() takes the drv_cmd == NULL path and calls
amdxdna_cmd_set_state(job-&amp;gt;cmd_bo) -&amp;gt; amdxdna_gem_vmap(NULL) -&amp;gt;
to_gobj(NULL)-&amp;gt;dev, a NULL pointer dereference in the drm_sched worker.
A process with access to the accel node on a system with a probed AMD NPU
can trigger a kernel oops with a single AMDXDNA_EXEC_CMD ioctl
(cmd_handles = 0).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only internal driver commands (SYNC_DEBUG_BO / ATTACH_DEBUG_BO)
legitimately pass AMDXDNA_INVALID_BO_HANDLE, and they always set drv_cmd.
Reject the invalid handle for user submissions (drv_cmd == NULL) at the
submit choke point so every user path is covered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;accel/amdxdna: reject user command submission without a command BO&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;amdxdna_drm_submit_execbuf() passes the user-supplied command BO handle
straight into amdxdna_cmd_submit() with drv_cmd == NULL. When the handle
is AMDXDNA_INVALID_BO_HANDLE (0), the block that fetches job-&amp;gt;cmd_bo is
skipped, leaving it NULL, and no check rejects it on the user path (the
!job-&amp;gt;cmd_bo guard lives inside the != INVALID branch).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The job is then armed and pushed to the DRM scheduler.
aie2_sched_job_run() takes the drv_cmd == NULL path and calls
amdxdna_cmd_set_state(job-&amp;gt;cmd_bo) -&amp;gt; amdxdna_gem_vmap(NULL) -&amp;gt;
to_gobj(NULL)-&amp;gt;dev, a NULL pointer dereference in the drm_sched worker.
A process with access to the accel node on a system with a probed AMD NPU
can trigger a kernel oops with a single AMDXDNA_EXEC_CMD ioctl
(cmd_handles = 0).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only internal driver commands (SYNC_DEBUG_BO / ATTACH_DEBUG_BO)
legitimately pass AMDXDNA_INVALID_BO_HANDLE, and they always set drv_cmd.
Reject the invalid handle for user submissions (drv_cmd == NULL) at the
submit choke point so every user path is covered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72091</guid>
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