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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:29:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-72197 — fs/ntfs3: bound DeleteIndexEntryAllocation memmove length</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72197</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: bound DeleteIndexEntryAllocation memmove length&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In do_action()&amp;#39;s DeleteIndexEntryAllocation case, e-&amp;gt;size comes
from an on-disk INDEX_BUFFER entry.  When e-&amp;gt;size makes
e + e-&amp;gt;size point past hdr + hdr-&amp;gt;used,
PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) returns a negative ptrdiff_t
that is silently cast to a quasi-infinite size_t when passed
to memmove().  The memmove then walks past the destination
buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sibling DeleteIndexEntryRoot case at fslog.c:3540-3543
already carries the corresponding guard:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) &amp;lt; esize ||
	    Add2Ptr(e, esize) &amp;gt; Add2Ptr(lrh, rec_len) ||
	    used + esize &amp;gt; le32_to_cpu(hdr-&amp;gt;total)) {
		goto dirty_vol;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Apply the same shape to the allocation-path case.  Also reject
esize == 0: memmove(e, e, ...) is a no-op and leaves
hdr-&amp;gt;used unchanged, hiding a malformed entry from the
existing check_index_header() walk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 by
mounting a crafted NTFS image: the unguarded memmove takes a
length of 0xffffffffffffff00 and the kernel oopses in
memmove+0x81/0x1a0 on the do_action+0x36a2 frame.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes]&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs/ntfs3: bound DeleteIndexEntryAllocation memmove length&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In do_action()&amp;#39;s DeleteIndexEntryAllocation case, e-&amp;gt;size comes
from an on-disk INDEX_BUFFER entry.  When e-&amp;gt;size makes
e + e-&amp;gt;size point past hdr + hdr-&amp;gt;used,
PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) returns a negative ptrdiff_t
that is silently cast to a quasi-infinite size_t when passed
to memmove().  The memmove then walks past the destination
buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The sibling DeleteIndexEntryRoot case at fslog.c:3540-3543
already carries the corresponding guard:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) &amp;lt; esize ||
	    Add2Ptr(e, esize) &amp;gt; Add2Ptr(lrh, rec_len) ||
	    used + esize &amp;gt; le32_to_cpu(hdr-&amp;gt;total)) {
		goto dirty_vol;
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Apply the same shape to the allocation-path case.  Also reject
esize == 0: memmove(e, e, ...) is a no-op and leaves
hdr-&amp;gt;used unchanged, hiding a malformed entry from the
existing check_index_header() walk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 by
mounting a crafted NTFS image: the unguarded memmove takes a
length of 0xffffffffffffff00 and the kernel oopses in
memmove+0x81/0x1a0 on the do_action+0x36a2 frame.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: clang-formatted the changes]&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-72197</guid>
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