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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:25:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74282 — tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74282</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count
from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it
does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tsk-&amp;gt;snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK
message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction
wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true
and starving the connection of further transmits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the
message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or,
for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a
TIPC connection&amp;#39;s send side by sending an oversized connection ack.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc: prevent snt_unacked underflow on CONN_ACK&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc_sk_conn_proto_rcv() subtracts the peer-supplied connection ack count
from the unsigned 16-bit send counter snt_unacked without checking that it
does not exceed the number of messages actually outstanding:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tsk-&amp;gt;snt_unacked -= msg_conn_ack(hdr);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;msg_conn_ack() is read straight from a received CONN_MANAGER/CONN_ACK
message. If the ack count is larger than snt_unacked, the subtraction
wraps to a near-maximum value, leaving tsk_conn_cong() permanently true
and starving the connection of further transmits.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validate the ACK count at the start of the CONN_ACK block and drop the
message if it acknowledges more messages than are outstanding. A peer (or,
for a local connection, the connected peer socket) can otherwise wedge a
TIPC connection&amp;#39;s send side by sending an oversized connection ack.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74282</guid>
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