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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:25:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74444 — drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74444</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vmw_cmd_draw() computes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;maxnum = (header-&amp;gt;size - sizeof(cmd-&amp;gt;body)) / sizeof(*decl);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;where header-&amp;gt;size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied
command stream.  When header-&amp;gt;size is less than sizeof(cmd-&amp;gt;body) the
unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum.
Any user-controlled cmd-&amp;gt;body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and
the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command
bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject undersized headers up front.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vmw_cmd_draw() computes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;maxnum = (header-&amp;gt;size - sizeof(cmd-&amp;gt;body)) / sizeof(*decl);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;where header-&amp;gt;size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied
command stream.  When header-&amp;gt;size is less than sizeof(cmd-&amp;gt;body) the
unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum.
Any user-controlled cmd-&amp;gt;body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and
the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command
bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject undersized headers up front.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74444</guid>
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