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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:26:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74484 — binfmt_misc: don't let an 'F' entry pin its own instance</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74484</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binfmt_misc: don&amp;#39;t let an &amp;#39;F&amp;#39; entry pin its own instance&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An entry registered with &amp;#39;F&amp;#39; opens its interpreter at registration time
and holds that file until the entry is freed. Any entry nobody removes
by hand only gets closed once the binfmt_misc superblock is shut down.
If the interpreter lives on a mount that keeps that superblock alive the
two pin each other:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binfmt_misc sb -&amp;gt; inode -&amp;gt; entry -&amp;gt; interp_file -&amp;gt; vfsmount -&amp;gt; binfmt_misc sb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;TL;DR the file is never closed. Once the mount namespace is gone there
is nothing left to unregister through either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are two ways to trigger this bug:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Point the interpreter at the instance itself. Its files are regular
  files owned by the mounter and both bm_get_inode() and
  simple_fill_super() leave i_op at empty_iops. So notify_change() falls
  back to simple_setattr() and chmod +x works. We never set SB_I_NOEXEC
  and so open_exec() accepts it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Use the instance as an overlayfs lower layer. The overlay superblock
  holds a clone_private_mount() of every layer until it is destroyed and
  that clone is in no namespace. So umount_tree() never reaches it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That&amp;#39;s a DoS. And it isn&amp;#39;t only the superblock that leaks. It pins the
user namespace it was mounted in, so every iteration permanently eats
one of the caller&amp;#39;s user namespace charges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So let&amp;#39;s just do the sane thing. SB_I_NOEXEC makes open_exec() fail on
the instance&amp;#39;s own files and s_stack_depth mak…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binfmt_misc: don&amp;#39;t let an &amp;#39;F&amp;#39; entry pin its own instance&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An entry registered with &amp;#39;F&amp;#39; opens its interpreter at registration time
and holds that file until the entry is freed. Any entry nobody removes
by hand only gets closed once the binfmt_misc superblock is shut down.
If the interpreter lives on a mount that keeps that superblock alive the
two pin each other:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;binfmt_misc sb -&amp;gt; inode -&amp;gt; entry -&amp;gt; interp_file -&amp;gt; vfsmount -&amp;gt; binfmt_misc sb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;TL;DR the file is never closed. Once the mount namespace is gone there
is nothing left to unregister through either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are two ways to trigger this bug:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Point the interpreter at the instance itself. Its files are regular
  files owned by the mounter and both bm_get_inode() and
  simple_fill_super() leave i_op at empty_iops. So notify_change() falls
  back to simple_setattr() and chmod +x works. We never set SB_I_NOEXEC
  and so open_exec() accepts it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Use the instance as an overlayfs lower layer. The overlay superblock
  holds a clone_private_mount() of every layer until it is destroyed and
  that clone is in no namespace. So umount_tree() never reaches it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That&amp;#39;s a DoS. And it isn&amp;#39;t only the superblock that leaks. It pins the
user namespace it was mounted in, so every iteration permanently eats
one of the caller&amp;#39;s user namespace charges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So let&amp;#39;s just do the sane thing. SB_I_NOEXEC makes open_exec() fail on
the instance&amp;#39;s own files and s_stack_depth mak…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74484</guid>
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