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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 15:25:30 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74499 — ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74499</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_usbmidi_akai_output() computes its fill-loop bound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;buf_end = ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer - MAX_AKAI_SYSEX_LEN - 1;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;as a signed int, so a small device-advertised bulk-OUT max_transfer
makes buf_end negative.  The loop guard then compares the u32
urb-&amp;gt;transfer_buffer_length against that negative int: the usual
arithmetic conversion turns buf_end into a large unsigned value, so the
guard stays true and each iteration keeps appending SysEx framing and
payload bytes past the end of the URB transfer buffer, which is only
max_transfer bytes long.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A USB device that advertises a tiny bulk-OUT endpoint can therefore
trigger an attacker-length- and content-controlled heap out-of-bounds
write when a process writes to the created /dev/snd/midiC*D* node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Return early when there is no room for even one SysEx, so the loop is
never entered with a bound that would wrap.  The loop is the last
statement of the function, so bailing out is equivalent to it not
running.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee &amp;lt;baul.lee@xbow.com&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;snd_usbmidi_akai_output() computes its fill-loop bound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;buf_end = ep-&amp;gt;max_transfer - MAX_AKAI_SYSEX_LEN - 1;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;as a signed int, so a small device-advertised bulk-OUT max_transfer
makes buf_end negative.  The loop guard then compares the u32
urb-&amp;gt;transfer_buffer_length against that negative int: the usual
arithmetic conversion turns buf_end into a large unsigned value, so the
guard stays true and each iteration keeps appending SysEx framing and
payload bytes past the end of the URB transfer buffer, which is only
max_transfer bytes long.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A USB device that advertises a tiny bulk-OUT endpoint can therefore
trigger an attacker-length- and content-controlled heap out-of-bounds
write when a process writes to the created /dev/snd/midiC*D* node.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Return early when there is no room for even one SysEx, so the loop is
never entered with a bound that would wrap.  The loop is the last
statement of the function, so bailing out is equivalent to it not
running.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee &amp;lt;baul.lee@xbow.com&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74499</guid>
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