https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 23:24:22 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90284 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>firmware_loader: do not queue completed sysfs fallback requests</p> <p>fw_load_sysfs_fallback() calls device_add() before adding the fw_priv to pending_fw_head. device_add() publishes the fallback loading interface, so a userspace helper which discovers the device by scanning sysfs can write 0 to the loading attribute and complete the request before it is queued as pending.</p> <p>In that interleaving firmware_loading_store() calls fw_state_done() while pending_list still points to itself, so it cannot remove an entry from pending_fw_head. The subsequent unconditional list_add() then queues an already-completed fw_priv. Once the request is released, pending_fw_head can retain a pointer to freed memory and the next fallback request can fault while validating the list.</p> <p>Only in-flight fallback requests need suspend or reboot abort handling. If the request is already DONE after device_add(), return success from the fallback path without sending another uevent, waiting again, or queueing it as pending. This preserves the invariant that pending_fw_head contains only active fallback requests.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>firmware_loader: do not queue completed sysfs fallback requests</p> <p>fw_load_sysfs_fallback() calls device_add() before adding the fw_priv to pending_fw_head. device_add() publishes the fallback loading interface, so a userspace helper which discovers the device by scanning sysfs can write 0 to the loading attribute and complete the request before it is queued as pending.</p> <p>In that interleaving firmware_loading_store() calls fw_state_done() while pending_list still points to itself, so it cannot remove an entry from pending_fw_head. The subsequent unconditional list_add() then queues an already-completed fw_priv. Once the request is released, pending_fw_head can retain a pointer to freed memory and the next fallback request can fault while validating the list.</p> <p>Only in-flight fallback requests need suspend or reboot abort handling. If the request is already DONE after device_add(), return success from the fallback path without sending another uevent, waiting again, or queueing it as pending. This preserves the invariant that pending_fw_head contains only active fallback requests.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90284