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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 10:11:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-93207 — SUNRPC: Zero rpc_gss_wire_cred at svcauth_gss_decode_credbody() entry</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93207</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SUNRPC: Zero rpc_gss_wire_cred at svcauth_gss_decode_credbody() entry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;svcauth_gss_decode_credbody() writes the caller&amp;#39;s
rpc_gss_wire_cred field by field and assigns gc_ctx.len only on
the success tail.  The caller storage is svcdata-&amp;gt;clcred, which
lives in the per-svc_rqst gss_svc_data and is reused across
requests.  Early decode failures leave partially decoded state
mixed with residue from the prior request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The trailing body_len tightness check is the sharpest case:
xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline() has already written gc_ctx.data
with a borrowed inline pointer into the current request&amp;#39;s XDR
pages, but gc_ctx.len retains its prior value.  Once the request
pages are released the pooled clcred carries a dangling pointer
paired with a stale length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zero the caller&amp;#39;s rpc_gss_wire_cred at function entry so that
every early-return path leaves a deterministic all-zero cred.
On the trailing tightness-check path, gc_ctx.len is now zero
instead of stale, which neuters length-driven consumers such as
gss_svc_searchbyctx() that would otherwise walk the dangling
data pointer.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SUNRPC: Zero rpc_gss_wire_cred at svcauth_gss_decode_credbody() entry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;svcauth_gss_decode_credbody() writes the caller&amp;#39;s
rpc_gss_wire_cred field by field and assigns gc_ctx.len only on
the success tail.  The caller storage is svcdata-&amp;gt;clcred, which
lives in the per-svc_rqst gss_svc_data and is reused across
requests.  Early decode failures leave partially decoded state
mixed with residue from the prior request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The trailing body_len tightness check is the sharpest case:
xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline() has already written gc_ctx.data
with a borrowed inline pointer into the current request&amp;#39;s XDR
pages, but gc_ctx.len retains its prior value.  Once the request
pages are released the pooled clcred carries a dangling pointer
paired with a stale length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zero the caller&amp;#39;s rpc_gss_wire_cred at function entry so that
every early-return path leaves a deterministic all-zero cred.
On the trailing tightness-check path, gc_ctx.len is now zero
instead of stale, which neuters length-driven consumers such as
gss_svc_searchbyctx() that would otherwise walk the dangling
data pointer.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-93207</guid>
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