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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 18:31:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-30830 — Defuddle: XSS via unescaped string interpolation in _findContentBySchemaText image tag</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-30830</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; kepano defuddle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Defuddle cleans up HTML pages. Prior to version 0.9.0, the _findContentBySchemaText method in src/defuddle.ts interpolates image src and alt attributes directly into an HTML string without escaping. An attacker can use a &amp;#34; in the alt attribute to break out of the attribute context and inject event handler. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; kepano defuddle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Defuddle cleans up HTML pages. Prior to version 0.9.0, the _findContentBySchemaText method in src/defuddle.ts interpolates image src and alt attributes directly into an HTML string without escaping. An attacker can use a &amp;#34; in the alt attribute to break out of the attribute context and inject event handler. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-30830</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5mq8-78gm-pjmq — defuddle vulnerable to XSS via unescaped string interpolation in _findContentBySchemaText image tag</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5mq8-78gm-pjmq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: defuddle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_findContentBySchemaText` method in `src/defuddle.ts` interpolates image `src` and `alt` attributes directly into an HTML string without escaping:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
html += `&amp;lt;img src=&amp;#34;${imageSrc}&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;${imageAlt}&amp;#34;&amp;gt;`;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can use a `&amp;#34;` in the `alt` attribute to break out of the attribute context and inject event handlers. This is a separate vulnerability from the sanitization bypass fixed in f154cb7 — the injection happens during string construction, not in the DOM, so `_stripUnsafeElements` cannot catch it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `_findContentBySchemaText` finds a sibling image outside the matched content element, it reads the image&amp;#39;s `src` and `alt` attributes via `getAttribute()` and interpolates them into a template literal. `getAttribute(&amp;#39;alt&amp;#39;)` returns the raw attribute value. If the alt contains `&amp;#34;`, it terminates the `alt` attribute in the interpolated HTML string, and subsequent content becomes new attributes (including event handlers).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The recently added `_stripUnsafeElements()` (commit f154cb7) strips `on*` attributes from DOM elements, but the `alt` attribute&amp;#39;s name is `alt` (not `on*`), so it is preserved with its full value. The `onload` handler is created by the string interpolation, not present in the original DOM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input HTML:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```html
&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE html&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;html&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;head&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;title&amp;gt;PoC&amp;lt;/title&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;script type=&amp;#34;application/ld+json&amp;#34;&amp;gt;
{&amp;#34;@type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Article&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;text&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Long article text repeated many times to exceed the extracted content word co…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: defuddle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `_findContentBySchemaText` method in `src/defuddle.ts` interpolates image `src` and `alt` attributes directly into an HTML string without escaping:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```typescript
html += `&amp;lt;img src=&amp;#34;${imageSrc}&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;${imageAlt}&amp;#34;&amp;gt;`;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can use a `&amp;#34;` in the `alt` attribute to break out of the attribute context and inject event handlers. This is a separate vulnerability from the sanitization bypass fixed in f154cb7 — the injection happens during string construction, not in the DOM, so `_stripUnsafeElements` cannot catch it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `_findContentBySchemaText` finds a sibling image outside the matched content element, it reads the image&amp;#39;s `src` and `alt` attributes via `getAttribute()` and interpolates them into a template literal. `getAttribute(&amp;#39;alt&amp;#39;)` returns the raw attribute value. If the alt contains `&amp;#34;`, it terminates the `alt` attribute in the interpolated HTML string, and subsequent content becomes new attributes (including event handlers).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The recently added `_stripUnsafeElements()` (commit f154cb7) strips `on*` attributes from DOM elements, but the `alt` attribute&amp;#39;s name is `alt` (not `on*`), so it is preserved with its full value. The `onload` handler is created by the string interpolation, not present in the original DOM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input HTML:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```html
&amp;lt;!DOCTYPE html&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;html&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;head&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;title&amp;gt;PoC&amp;lt;/title&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;script type=&amp;#34;application/ld+json&amp;#34;&amp;gt;
{&amp;#34;@type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Article&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;text&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;Long article text repeated many times to exceed the extracted content word co…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5mq8-78gm-pjmq</guid>
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