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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:22:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2025-65015 — joserfc has Possible Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Vulnerability Triggered by Logging Arbitrarily Large JWT Token P…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-65015</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; authlib joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. In versions from 1.3.3 to before 1.3.5 and from 1.4.0 to before 1.4.2, the ExceededSizeError exception messages are embedded with non-decoded JWT token parts and may cause Python logging to record an arbitrarily large, forged JWT payload. In situations where a misconfigured — or entirely absent — production-grade web server sits in front of a Python web application, an attacker may be able to send arbitrarily large bearer tokens in the HTTP request headers. When this occurs, Python logging or diagnostic tools (e.g., Sentry) may end up processing extremely large log messages containing the full JWT header during the joserfc.jwt.decode() operation. The same behavior also appears when validating claims and signature payload sizes, as the library raises joserfc.errors.ExceededSizeError() with the full payload embedded in the exception message. Since the payload is already fully loaded into memory at this stage, the library cannot prevent or reject it. This issue has been patched in versions 1.3.5 and 1.4.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; authlib joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. In versions from 1.3.3 to before 1.3.5 and from 1.4.0 to before 1.4.2, the ExceededSizeError exception messages are embedded with non-decoded JWT token parts and may cause Python logging to record an arbitrarily large, forged JWT payload. In situations where a misconfigured — or entirely absent — production-grade web server sits in front of a Python web application, an attacker may be able to send arbitrarily large bearer tokens in the HTTP request headers. When this occurs, Python logging or diagnostic tools (e.g., Sentry) may end up processing extremely large log messages containing the full JWT header during the joserfc.jwt.decode() operation. The same behavior also appears when validating claims and signature payload sizes, as the library raises joserfc.errors.ExceededSizeError() with the full payload embedded in the exception message. Since the payload is already fully loaded into memory at this stage, the library cannot prevent or reject it. This issue has been patched in versions 1.3.5 and 1.4.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-65015</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-frfh-8v73-gjg4 — joserfc has Possible Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Vulnerability Triggered by Logging Arbitrarily Large JWT Token P…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-frfh-8v73-gjg4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `ExceededSizeError` exception messages are embedded with non-decoded JWT token parts and may cause Python logging to record an arbitrarily large, forged JWT payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In situations where a misconfigured — or entirely absent — production-grade web server sits in front of a Python web application, an attacker may be able to send arbitrarily large bearer tokens in the HTTP request headers. When this occurs, Python logging or diagnostic tools (e.g., Sentry) may end up processing extremely large log messages containing the full JWT header during the `joserfc.jwt.decode()` operation. The same behavior also appears when validating claims and signature payload sizes, as the library raises `joserfc.errors.ExceededSizeError()` with the full payload embedded in the exception message. Since the payload is already fully loaded into memory at this stage, the library cannot prevent or reject it per se.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is therefore the responsibility of the underlying web server (`uvicorn`/`h11`, `gunicorn`, `Starlette`, `Werkzeug`, `nginx`...etc) to enforce limits on header sizes. For example, a `FastAPI`/`Starlette` application running _without_ `uvicorn` and/or `gunicorn` cannot enforce header size limits on its own. With `uvicorn`/`h11`, the [--h11-max-incomplete-event-size &amp;lt;int&amp;gt;](https://uvicorn.dev/settings/#implementation:~:text=%2D%2Dh11%2Dmax%2Dincomplete%2Devent%2Dsize%20%3Cint%3E) option can restrict the total size of the header _plus_ body, but not the header alo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `ExceededSizeError` exception messages are embedded with non-decoded JWT token parts and may cause Python logging to record an arbitrarily large, forged JWT payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In situations where a misconfigured — or entirely absent — production-grade web server sits in front of a Python web application, an attacker may be able to send arbitrarily large bearer tokens in the HTTP request headers. When this occurs, Python logging or diagnostic tools (e.g., Sentry) may end up processing extremely large log messages containing the full JWT header during the `joserfc.jwt.decode()` operation. The same behavior also appears when validating claims and signature payload sizes, as the library raises `joserfc.errors.ExceededSizeError()` with the full payload embedded in the exception message. Since the payload is already fully loaded into memory at this stage, the library cannot prevent or reject it per se.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is therefore the responsibility of the underlying web server (`uvicorn`/`h11`, `gunicorn`, `Starlette`, `Werkzeug`, `nginx`...etc) to enforce limits on header sizes. For example, a `FastAPI`/`Starlette` application running _without_ `uvicorn` and/or `gunicorn` cannot enforce header size limits on its own. With `uvicorn`/`h11`, the [--h11-max-incomplete-event-size &amp;lt;int&amp;gt;](https://uvicorn.dev/settings/#implementation:~:text=%2D%2Dh11%2Dmax%2Dincomplete%2Devent%2Dsize%20%3Cint%3E) option can restrict the total size of the header _plus_ body, but not the header alo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-frfh-8v73-gjg4</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-361 — joserfc has Possible Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Vulnerability Triggered by Logging Arbitrarily Large JWT Token P…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-361</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `ExceededSizeError` exception messages are embedded with non-decoded JWT token parts and may cause Python logging to record an arbitrarily large, forged JWT payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In situations where a misconfigured — or entirely absent — production-grade web server sits in front of a Python web application, an attacker may be able to send arbitrarily large bearer tokens in the HTTP request headers. When this occurs, Python logging or diagnostic tools (e.g., Sentry) may end up processing extremely large log messages containing the full JWT header during the `joserfc.jwt.decode()` operation. The same behavior also appears when validating claims and signature payload sizes, as the library raises `joserfc.errors.ExceededSizeError()` with the full payload embedded in the exception message. Since the payload is already fully loaded into memory at this stage, the library cannot prevent or reject it per se.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is therefore the responsibility of the underlying web server (`uvicorn`/`h11`, `gunicorn`, `Starlette`, `Werkzeug`, `nginx`...etc) to enforce limits on header sizes. For example, a `FastAPI`/`Starlette` application running _without_ `uvicorn` and/or `gunicorn` cannot enforce header size limits on its own. With `uvicorn`/`h11`, the [--h11-max-incomplete-event-size &amp;lt;int&amp;gt;](https://uvicorn.dev/settings/#implementation:~:text=%2D%2Dh11%2Dmax%2Dincomplete%2Devent%2Dsize%20%3Cint%3E) option can restrict the total size of the header _plus_ body, but not the header alo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `ExceededSizeError` exception messages are embedded with non-decoded JWT token parts and may cause Python logging to record an arbitrarily large, forged JWT payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In situations where a misconfigured — or entirely absent — production-grade web server sits in front of a Python web application, an attacker may be able to send arbitrarily large bearer tokens in the HTTP request headers. When this occurs, Python logging or diagnostic tools (e.g., Sentry) may end up processing extremely large log messages containing the full JWT header during the `joserfc.jwt.decode()` operation. The same behavior also appears when validating claims and signature payload sizes, as the library raises `joserfc.errors.ExceededSizeError()` with the full payload embedded in the exception message. Since the payload is already fully loaded into memory at this stage, the library cannot prevent or reject it per se.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is therefore the responsibility of the underlying web server (`uvicorn`/`h11`, `gunicorn`, `Starlette`, `Werkzeug`, `nginx`...etc) to enforce limits on header sizes. For example, a `FastAPI`/`Starlette` application running _without_ `uvicorn` and/or `gunicorn` cannot enforce header size limits on its own. With `uvicorn`/`h11`, the [--h11-max-incomplete-event-size &amp;lt;int&amp;gt;](https://uvicorn.dev/settings/#implementation:~:text=%2D%2Dh11%2Dmax%2Dincomplete%2Devent%2Dsize%20%3Cint%3E) option can restrict the total size of the header _plus_ body, but not the header alo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-361</guid>
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