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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:51:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-44898 — Mistune TOC Anchor Injection XSS</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44898</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; lepture mistune&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.2.1, render_toc_ul() builds a &amp;lt;ul&amp;gt; table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href=&amp;#34;#&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&amp;#34;) and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into &amp;lt;a&amp;gt; tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value. When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href=&amp;#34;#...&amp;#34; attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; blocks directly into the rendered TOC. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; lepture mistune&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.2.1, render_toc_ul() builds a &amp;lt;ul&amp;gt; table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href=&amp;#34;#&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&amp;#34;) and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into &amp;lt;a&amp;gt; tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value. When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href=&amp;#34;#...&amp;#34; attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; blocks directly into the rendered TOC. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44898</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6269-cqxg-mhhv — Mistune TOC Anchor Injection XSS</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6269-cqxg-mhhv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mistune&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
`render_toc_ul()` builds a `&amp;lt;ul&amp;gt;` table-of-contents tree from a list of `(level, id, text)` tuples. Both the `id` value (used as `href=&amp;#34;#&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&amp;#34;`) and the `text` value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into `&amp;lt;a&amp;gt;` tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the `href=&amp;#34;#...&amp;#34;` attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;` blocks directly into the rendered TOC.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability is closely related to H2 (unescaped `id=` in `heading()`): the same `heading_id` callback pattern that triggers H2 also populates the `toc_items` list that `render_toc_ul()` consumes, meaning both vulnerabilities fire simultaneously in a typical documentation setup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
**File:** `src/mistune/toc.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def render_toc_ul(toc):
    ...
    for level, k, text in toc:
        # k   = heading id  (used verbatim as href fragment)
        # text = heading text (used verbatim as link label)
        item = &amp;#39;&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;#{}&amp;#34;&amp;gt;{}&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;&amp;#39;.format(k, text)
        # Neither k nor text is passed through escape() at any point
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `k` and `text` values come directly from the `toc_items` list accumulated during parsing. If `k` contains `&amp;#34;` or `&amp;gt;`, the `href` attribute is broken. If `text` contains `&amp;lt;`, raw tags are injected as the visible link content.…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mistune&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
`render_toc_ul()` builds a `&amp;lt;ul&amp;gt;` table-of-contents tree from a list of `(level, id, text)` tuples. Both the `id` value (used as `href=&amp;#34;#&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&amp;#34;`) and the `text` value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into `&amp;lt;a&amp;gt;` tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the `href=&amp;#34;#...&amp;#34;` attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;` blocks directly into the rendered TOC.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability is closely related to H2 (unescaped `id=` in `heading()`): the same `heading_id` callback pattern that triggers H2 also populates the `toc_items` list that `render_toc_ul()` consumes, meaning both vulnerabilities fire simultaneously in a typical documentation setup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
**File:** `src/mistune/toc.py`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def render_toc_ul(toc):
    ...
    for level, k, text in toc:
        # k   = heading id  (used verbatim as href fragment)
        # text = heading text (used verbatim as link label)
        item = &amp;#39;&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;#{}&amp;#34;&amp;gt;{}&amp;lt;/a&amp;gt;&amp;#39;.format(k, text)
        # Neither k nor text is passed through escape() at any point
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `k` and `text` values come directly from the `toc_items` list accumulated during parsing. If `k` contains `&amp;#34;` or `&amp;gt;`, the `href` attribute is broken. If `text` contains `&amp;lt;`, raw tags are injected as the visible link content.…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-6269-cqxg-mhhv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2208</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2208</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mistune&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.2.1, render_toc_ul() builds a &amp;lt;ul&amp;gt; table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href=&amp;#34;#&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&amp;#34;) and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into &amp;lt;a&amp;gt; tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value. When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href=&amp;#34;#...&amp;#34; attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; blocks directly into the rendered TOC. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mistune&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mistune is a Python Markdown parser with renderers and plugins. Prior to 3.2.1, render_toc_ul() builds a &amp;lt;ul&amp;gt; table-of-contents tree from a list of (level, id, text) tuples. Both the id value (used as href=&amp;#34;#&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&amp;#34;) and the text value (used as the visible link label) are inserted into &amp;lt;a&amp;gt; tags via a plain Python format string — with no HTML escaping applied to either value. When heading IDs are derived from user-supplied heading text (the standard use-case for readable slug anchors), an attacker can craft a heading whose text breaks out of the href=&amp;#34;#...&amp;#34; attribute context, injecting arbitrary HTML tags including &amp;lt;script&amp;gt; blocks directly into the rendered TOC. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2208</guid>
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