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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 12:39:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-48776 — LangGraph SDK has unsafe URL path construction</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48776</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; langchain-ai, langchain-ai langchain-sdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LangGraph Python SDK is used to connect to running LangGraph API servers, manage assistants, threads and stream runs from Python applications. Versions 0.3.14 and prior have unsafe URL path construction through unsanitized caller-supplied identifier values used in HTTP request paths for resource operations. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths could cause the resulting request to address a different resource (and potentially a different resource type) than the SDK method&amp;#39;s call site indicates. In deployments where the SDK receives identifier values that originate from untrusted sources, this could result in unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources beyond the calling user&amp;#39;s authorization scope. This issue is most consequential in deployments that forward end-user-supplied values directly into SDK identifier parameters without first validating them against an expected format (such as a UUID), and rely on URL-prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer (reverse proxy, edge gateway, WAF), where the authorization decision is made on the SDK call&amp;#39;s intended path rather than on the final delivered request path. The issue has been fixed in version 0.3.15.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; langchain-ai, langchain-ai langchain-sdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LangGraph Python SDK is used to connect to running LangGraph API servers, manage assistants, threads and stream runs from Python applications. Versions 0.3.14 and prior have unsafe URL path construction through unsanitized caller-supplied identifier values used in HTTP request paths for resource operations. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths could cause the resulting request to address a different resource (and potentially a different resource type) than the SDK method&amp;#39;s call site indicates. In deployments where the SDK receives identifier values that originate from untrusted sources, this could result in unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources beyond the calling user&amp;#39;s authorization scope. This issue is most consequential in deployments that forward end-user-supplied values directly into SDK identifier parameters without first validating them against an expected format (such as a UUID), and rely on URL-prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer (reverse proxy, edge gateway, WAF), where the authorization decision is made on the SDK call&amp;#39;s intended path rather than on the final delivered request path. The issue has been fixed in version 0.3.15.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48776</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w39p-vh2g-g8g5 — LangGraph SDK has unsafe URL path construction</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w39p-vh2g-g8g5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph-sdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`langgraph-sdk` constructs HTTP request paths for resource operations by interpolating caller-supplied identifier values into URL templates. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths could cause the resulting request to address a different resource (and potentially a different resource type) than the SDK method&amp;#39;s call site indicates. In deployments where the SDK receives identifier values that originate from untrusted sources, this could result in unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources beyond the calling user&amp;#39;s authorization scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue is most consequential in deployments that:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- forward end-user-supplied values directly into SDK identifier parameters without first validating them against an expected format (such as a UUID), and
- rely on URL-prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer (reverse proxy, edge gateway, WAF), where the authorization decision is made on the SDK call&amp;#39;s intended path rather than on the final delivered request path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There have no evidence of this behavior being triggered in the wild. This change is intended to reduce the surface available when caller-supplied identifier values originate from untrusted sources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected users / systems&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You may be affected if you:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- use `langgraph-sdk` (Python) to address resources by identifier, and
- pass identifier values into SDK methods that originate from end-user input, untrusted third-party calle…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph-sdk&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`langgraph-sdk` constructs HTTP request paths for resource operations by interpolating caller-supplied identifier values into URL templates. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths could cause the resulting request to address a different resource (and potentially a different resource type) than the SDK method&amp;#39;s call site indicates. In deployments where the SDK receives identifier values that originate from untrusted sources, this could result in unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources beyond the calling user&amp;#39;s authorization scope.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue is most consequential in deployments that:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- forward end-user-supplied values directly into SDK identifier parameters without first validating them against an expected format (such as a UUID), and
- rely on URL-prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer (reverse proxy, edge gateway, WAF), where the authorization decision is made on the SDK call&amp;#39;s intended path rather than on the final delivered request path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There have no evidence of this behavior being triggered in the wild. This change is intended to reduce the surface available when caller-supplied identifier values originate from untrusted sources.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected users / systems&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You may be affected if you:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- use `langgraph-sdk` (Python) to address resources by identifier, and
- pass identifier values into SDK methods that originate from end-user input, untrusted third-party calle…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w39p-vh2g-g8g5</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2194</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2194</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LangGraph Python SDK is used to connect to running LangGraph API servers, manage assistants, threads and stream runs from Python applications. Versions 0.3.14 and prior have unsafe URL path construction through unsanitized caller-supplied identifier values used in HTTP request paths for resource operations. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths could cause the resulting request to address a different resource (and potentially a different resource type) than the SDK method&amp;#39;s call site indicates. In deployments where the SDK receives identifier values that originate from untrusted sources, this could result in unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources beyond the calling user&amp;#39;s authorization scope. This issue is most consequential in deployments that forward end-user-supplied values directly into SDK identifier parameters without first validating them against an expected format (such as a UUID), and rely on URL-prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer (reverse proxy, edge gateway, WAF), where the authorization decision is made on the SDK call&amp;#39;s intended path rather than on the final delivered request path. The issue has been fixed in version 0.3.15.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LangGraph Python SDK is used to connect to running LangGraph API servers, manage assistants, threads and stream runs from Python applications. Versions 0.3.14 and prior have unsafe URL path construction through unsanitized caller-supplied identifier values used in HTTP request paths for resource operations. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special meaning in URL paths could cause the resulting request to address a different resource (and potentially a different resource type) than the SDK method&amp;#39;s call site indicates. In deployments where the SDK receives identifier values that originate from untrusted sources, this could result in unintended access, modification, or deletion of resources beyond the calling user&amp;#39;s authorization scope. This issue is most consequential in deployments that forward end-user-supplied values directly into SDK identifier parameters without first validating them against an expected format (such as a UUID), and rely on URL-prefix-based authorization at an upstream layer (reverse proxy, edge gateway, WAF), where the authorization decision is made on the SDK call&amp;#39;s intended path rather than on the final delivered request path. The issue has been fixed in version 0.3.15.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2194</guid>
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