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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 20:50:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-32116 — Magic Wormhole: "wormhole receive" allows arbitrary local file overwrite</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32116</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; magic-wormhole&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Magic Wormhole makes it possible to get arbitrary-sized files and directories from one computer to another. From 0.21.0 to before 0.23.0, receiving a file (wormhole receive) from a malicious party could result in overwriting critical local files, including ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and .bashrc. This could be used to compromise the receiver&amp;#39;s computer. Only the sender of the file (the party who runs wormhole send) can mount the attack. Other parties (including the transit/relay servers) are excluded by the wormhole protocol. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; magic-wormhole&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Magic Wormhole makes it possible to get arbitrary-sized files and directories from one computer to another. From 0.21.0 to before 0.23.0, receiving a file (wormhole receive) from a malicious party could result in overwriting critical local files, including ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and .bashrc. This could be used to compromise the receiver&amp;#39;s computer. Only the sender of the file (the party who runs wormhole send) can mount the attack. Other parties (including the transit/relay servers) are excluded by the wormhole protocol. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.23.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32116</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4g4c-mfqg-pj8r — Magic Wormhole: "wormhole receive" allows arbitrary local file overwrite</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4g4c-mfqg-pj8r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: magic-wormhole&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Receiving a file (`wormhole receive`) from a malicious party could result in overwriting critical local files, including `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` and `.bashrc`. This could be used to compromise the receiver&amp;#39;s computer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the sender of the file (the party who runs `wormhole send`) can mount the attack. Other parties (including the transit/relay servers) are excluded by the wormhole protocol.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug has been fixed in magic-wormhole 0.23.0. All users should upgrade to this version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability first surfaced in the 0.21.0 release on 23-Oct-2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a workaround, the receiver can override the sender&amp;#39;s filename with the `--output` or `-o` option. For example: `wormhole receive -o shopping-list.txt` will write the file to `shopping-list.txt` in the local directory, regardless of what the sender tries to do. To be effective, this option must be added to every invocation of `wormhole receive` / `wormhole rx`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incoming file transfer requests include a `filename`, used to decide where the file contents will be written. Well-behaving senders compute this from the `basename()` of the sent file (which discards all but the last segment of the path). To guard…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: magic-wormhole&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Receiving a file (`wormhole receive`) from a malicious party could result in overwriting critical local files, including `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` and `.bashrc`. This could be used to compromise the receiver&amp;#39;s computer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the sender of the file (the party who runs `wormhole send`) can mount the attack. Other parties (including the transit/relay servers) are excluded by the wormhole protocol.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug has been fixed in magic-wormhole 0.23.0. All users should upgrade to this version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability first surfaced in the 0.21.0 release on 23-Oct-2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a workaround, the receiver can override the sender&amp;#39;s filename with the `--output` or `-o` option. For example: `wormhole receive -o shopping-list.txt` will write the file to `shopping-list.txt` in the local directory, regardless of what the sender tries to do. To be effective, this option must be added to every invocation of `wormhole receive` / `wormhole rx`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incoming file transfer requests include a `filename`, used to decide where the file contents will be written. Well-behaving senders compute this from the `basename()` of the sent file (which discards all but the last segment of the path). To guard…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4g4c-mfqg-pj8r</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2615 — Magic Wormhole: "wormhole receive" allows arbitrary local file overwrite</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2615</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: magic-wormhole&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Receiving a file (`wormhole receive`) from a malicious party could result in overwriting critical local files, including `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` and `.bashrc`. This could be used to compromise the receiver&amp;#39;s computer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the sender of the file (the party who runs `wormhole send`) can mount the attack. Other parties (including the transit/relay servers) are excluded by the wormhole protocol.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug has been fixed in magic-wormhole 0.23.0. All users should upgrade to this version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability first surfaced in the 0.21.0 release on 23-Oct-2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a workaround, the receiver can override the sender&amp;#39;s filename with the `--output` or `-o` option. For example: `wormhole receive -o shopping-list.txt` will write the file to `shopping-list.txt` in the local directory, regardless of what the sender tries to do. To be effective, this option must be added to every invocation of `wormhole receive` / `wormhole rx`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incoming file transfer requests include a `filename`, used to decide where the file contents will be written. Well-behaving senders compute this from the `basename()` of the sent file (which discards all but the last segment of the path). To guard…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: magic-wormhole&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Receiving a file (`wormhole receive`) from a malicious party could result in overwriting critical local files, including `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` and `.bashrc`. This could be used to compromise the receiver&amp;#39;s computer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only the sender of the file (the party who runs `wormhole send`) can mount the attack. Other parties (including the transit/relay servers) are excluded by the wormhole protocol.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug has been fixed in magic-wormhole 0.23.0. All users should upgrade to this version.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability first surfaced in the 0.21.0 release on 23-Oct-2025.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a workaround, the receiver can override the sender&amp;#39;s filename with the `--output` or `-o` option. For example: `wormhole receive -o shopping-list.txt` will write the file to `shopping-list.txt` in the local directory, regardless of what the sender tries to do. To be effective, this option must be added to every invocation of `wormhole receive` / `wormhole rx`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incoming file transfer requests include a `filename`, used to decide where the file contents will be written. Well-behaving senders compute this from the `basename()` of the sent file (which discards all but the last segment of the path). To guard…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2615</guid>
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