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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-49855 — tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-49855</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; tornadoweb tornado&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.6, Tornado gzip decompression routines processed limited-size chunks but did not enforce an overall limit on accumulated decompressed chunks, allowing a malicious server accessed by SimpleAsyncHTTPClient or an HTTPServer configured with decompress_request=True to consume effectively unlimited memory. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; tornadoweb tornado&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.6, Tornado gzip decompression routines processed limited-size chunks but did not enforce an overall limit on accumulated decompressed chunks, allowing a malicious server accessed by SimpleAsyncHTTPClient or an HTTPServer configured with decompress_request=True to consume effectively unlimited memory. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-49855</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mgf9-4vpg-hj56 — tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mgf9-4vpg-hj56</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: tornado&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tornado&amp;#39;s gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: tornado&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tornado&amp;#39;s gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-mgf9-4vpg-hj56</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3389 — tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3389</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: tornado&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tornado&amp;#39;s gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: tornado&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tornado&amp;#39;s gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting `decompress_response=False` or using `CurlAsyncHTTPClient`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3389</guid>
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