https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 13:38:29 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-27646 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.7 contain a sandbox escape vulnerability in the /acp spawn command that allows authorized sandboxed sessions to initialize host-side ACP runtime. Attackers can bypass sandbox restrictions by invoking the /acp spawn slash-command to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP session initialization when ACP is enabled.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.7 contain a sandbox escape vulnerability in the /acp spawn command that allows authorized sandboxed sessions to initialize host-side ACP runtime. Attackers can bypass sandbox restrictions by invoking the /acp spawn slash-command to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP session initialization when ACP is enabled.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-27646 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9q36-67vc-rrwg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary Sandboxed requester sessions could reach host-side ACP session initialization through `/acp spawn`.</p> <p>OpenClaw already blocked `sessions_spawn({ runtime: &#34;acp&#34; })` from sandboxed sessions, but the slash-command path initialized ACP directly without applying the same host-runtime guard first.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - npm package: `openclaw` - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.3.2` - Patched version: `&gt;= 2026.3.7`</p> <p>### Details ACP sessions run on the host, not inside the OpenClaw sandbox. The direct ACP spawn path in `src/agents/acp-spawn.ts` already denied sandboxed requesters, but `/acp spawn` in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts` called `initializeSession(...)` without first applying the same restriction.</p> <p>In affected versions, an already authorized sender in a sandboxed session could use `/acp spawn` to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP runtime initialization when ACP was enabled and a backend was available.</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3`</p> <p>### Fix Details The fix introduced a shared ACP runtime-policy guard in `src/agents/acp-spawn.ts` and reused it from the `/acp spawn` handler in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts` before any ACP backend initialization. Regression coverage was added in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp.test.ts` to prove sandboxed `/acp spawn` requests are rejected early, while existing ACP spawn behavior for non-sandboxed sessions remains unchanged.</p> <p>### Relea…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary Sandboxed requester sessions could reach host-side ACP session initialization through `/acp spawn`.</p> <p>OpenClaw already blocked `sessions_spawn({ runtime: &#34;acp&#34; })` from sandboxed sessions, but the slash-command path initialized ACP directly without applying the same host-runtime guard first.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions - npm package: `openclaw` - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.3.2` - Patched version: `&gt;= 2026.3.7`</p> <p>### Details ACP sessions run on the host, not inside the OpenClaw sandbox. The direct ACP spawn path in `src/agents/acp-spawn.ts` already denied sandboxed requesters, but `/acp spawn` in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts` called `initializeSession(...)` without first applying the same restriction.</p> <p>In affected versions, an already authorized sender in a sandboxed session could use `/acp spawn` to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP runtime initialization when ACP was enabled and a backend was available.</p> <p>### Fix Commit(s) - `61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3`</p> <p>### Fix Details The fix introduced a shared ACP runtime-policy guard in `src/agents/acp-spawn.ts` and reused it from the `/acp spawn` handler in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts` before any ACP backend initialization. Regression coverage was added in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp.test.ts` to prove sandboxed `/acp spawn` requests are rejected early, while existing ACP spawn behavior for non-sandboxed sessions remains unchanged.</p> <p>### Relea…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9q36-67vc-rrwg