https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 17:34:28 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-28446 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-28446 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>An authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.</p> <p>Deployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- `openclaw` (npm): `&lt;= 2026.2.1` - Fixed in: `&gt;= 2026.2.2`</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>In affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.</p> <p>This allowed two bypasses:</p> <p>1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed. 2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.</p> <p>### Proof Of Concept</p> <p>1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: [&#34;+15550001234&#34;]`. 2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted. 3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Only operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>An authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.</p> <p>Deployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.</p> <p>### Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- `openclaw` (npm): `&lt;= 2026.2.1` - Fixed in: `&gt;= 2026.2.2`</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>In affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.</p> <p>This allowed two bypasses:</p> <p>1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed. 2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.</p> <p>### Proof Of Concept</p> <p>1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: [&#34;+15550001234&#34;]`. 2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted. 3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Only operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x