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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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      <title>CVE-2026-32046 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.2.21 - OS-level Sandbox Bypass via --no-sandbox Flag</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32046</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.21 contain an improper sandbox configuration vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by exploiting renderer-side vulnerabilities without requiring a sandbox escape. Attackers can leverage the disabled OS-level sandbox protections in the Chromium browser container to achieve code execution on the host system.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.21 contain an improper sandbox configuration vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by exploiting renderer-side vulnerabilities without requiring a sandbox escape. Attackers can leverage the disabled OS-level sandbox protections in the Chromium browser container to achieve code execution on the host system.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-32046</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-43x4-g22p-3hrq — OpenClaw: Chrome --no-sandbox disabled OS-level browser sandbox in sandbox browser container</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-43x4-g22p-3hrq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Sandbox browser container launched Chromium with `--no-sandbox` by default, disabling Chromium&amp;#39;s OS-level sandbox protections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm ecosystem)
- Latest published npm version at triage time (2026-02-21): `2026.2.19-2`
- Affected range: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.19-2`
- Planned patched version for next release: `2026.2.21`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
When `--no-sandbox` is enabled by default, renderer compromise no longer requires a separate sandbox escape. This weakens container browser isolation and increases impact from renderer-side bugs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Resolution
- Default `--no-sandbox` removed from sandbox browser entrypoint.
- Explicit opt-in added via `OPENCLAW_BROWSER_NO_SANDBOX` / `CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_NO_SANDBOX`.
- Browser container hash migration + security audit checks added so stale containers are surfaced and can be recreated safely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- e7eba01efc4c3c400e9cfd3ce3d661cbc788a631
- 1835dec2004fe7a62c6a7ba46b8485f124ec6199&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release Process Note
The advisory `patched_versions` field is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.21`). After npm release publication, only advisory publish action should remain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw thanks @TerminalsandCoffee for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: openclaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
Sandbox browser container launched Chromium with `--no-sandbox` by default, disabling Chromium&amp;#39;s OS-level sandbox protections.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm ecosystem)
- Latest published npm version at triage time (2026-02-21): `2026.2.19-2`
- Affected range: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.19-2`
- Planned patched version for next release: `2026.2.21`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
When `--no-sandbox` is enabled by default, renderer compromise no longer requires a separate sandbox escape. This weakens container browser isolation and increases impact from renderer-side bugs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Resolution
- Default `--no-sandbox` removed from sandbox browser entrypoint.
- Explicit opt-in added via `OPENCLAW_BROWSER_NO_SANDBOX` / `CLAWDBOT_BROWSER_NO_SANDBOX`.
- Browser container hash migration + security audit checks added so stale containers are surfaced and can be recreated safely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- e7eba01efc4c3c400e9cfd3ce3d661cbc788a631
- 1835dec2004fe7a62c6a7ba46b8485f124ec6199&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release Process Note
The advisory `patched_versions` field is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.21`). After npm release publication, only advisory publish action should remain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw thanks @TerminalsandCoffee for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-43x4-g22p-3hrq</guid>
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