https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 12:58:57 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44996 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.4.15 contains an arbitrary local file read vulnerability in the webchat audio embedding helper that fails to apply local media root containment checks. Attackers can influence agent or tool-produced ReplyPayload.mediaUrl parameters to resolve absolute local paths or file URLs, read audio-like files, and embed them base64-encoded into webchat responses.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.4.15 contains an arbitrary local file read vulnerability in the webchat audio embedding helper that fails to apply local media root containment checks. Attackers can influence agent or tool-produced ReplyPayload.mediaUrl parameters to resolve absolute local paths or file URLs, read audio-like files, and embed them base64-encoded into webchat responses.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-44996 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gfg9-5357-hv4c <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>OpenClaw deployments before `2026.4.15` could embed host-local audio files into webchat responses without applying the local media root containment check used by other media-serving paths.</p> <p>If an attacker could influence an agent or tool-produced `ReplyPayload.mediaUrl`, the webchat audio embedding helper could resolve an absolute local path or `file:` URL, read an audio-like file under the size cap, and base64-encode it into the webchat media response. This crossed the model/tool-output boundary into a host file read. Prompt injection or malicious tool output is a delivery mechanism; the security boundary failure is the missing local-root containment check.</p> <p>The impact is narrow: the file had to be readable by the gateway process, have an audio-like extension, and fit within the webchat audio size cap. The issue exposed contents into the webchat assistant/media transcript path; it was not a general remote filesystem API.</p> <p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- Package: `openclaw` on npm - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.4.14` - Patched version: `2026.4.15`</p> <p>The latest public release, `2026.4.21`, also contains the fix.</p> <p>## Patches</p> <p>The public fix threads the applicable local media roots into the webchat audio embedding path and calls `assertLocalMediaAllowed` before local audio content is read. Current `main` also includes an additional `trustedLocalMedia` gate so untrusted model/tool payloads cannot opt into local audio embedding.</p> <p>Fix commit:</p> <p>- `6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>OpenClaw deployments before `2026.4.15` could embed host-local audio files into webchat responses without applying the local media root containment check used by other media-serving paths.</p> <p>If an attacker could influence an agent or tool-produced `ReplyPayload.mediaUrl`, the webchat audio embedding helper could resolve an absolute local path or `file:` URL, read an audio-like file under the size cap, and base64-encode it into the webchat media response. This crossed the model/tool-output boundary into a host file read. Prompt injection or malicious tool output is a delivery mechanism; the security boundary failure is the missing local-root containment check.</p> <p>The impact is narrow: the file had to be readable by the gateway process, have an audio-like extension, and fit within the webchat audio size cap. The issue exposed contents into the webchat assistant/media transcript path; it was not a general remote filesystem API.</p> <p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- Package: `openclaw` on npm - Affected versions: `&lt;= 2026.4.14` - Patched version: `2026.4.15`</p> <p>The latest public release, `2026.4.21`, also contains the fix.</p> <p>## Patches</p> <p>The public fix threads the applicable local media roots into the webchat audio embedding path and calls `assertLocalMediaAllowed` before local audio content is read. Current `main` also includes an additional `trustedLocalMedia` gate so untrusted model/tool payloads cannot opt into local audio embedding.</p> <p>Fix commit:</p> <p>- `6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gfg9-5357-hv4c