<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:05:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-42271 — LiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpoints</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-42271</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; BerriAI litellm, Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.3, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat Exploit Intelligence, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.74.2 to before version 1.83.7, two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the command, args, and env fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process. The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; BerriAI litellm, Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.3, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat Exploit Intelligence, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.74.2 to before version 1.83.7, two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the command, args, and env fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process. The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-42271</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v4p8-mg3p-g94g — LiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpoints</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v4p8-mg3p-g94g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the `command`, `args`, and `env` fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. Both test endpoints now require the `PROXY_ADMIN` role, bringing them into line with the save endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, developers should block `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` at their reverse proxy or API gateway.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the `command`, `args`, and `env` fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. Both test endpoints now require the `PROXY_ADMIN` role, bringing them into line with the save endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, developers should block `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` at their reverse proxy or API gateway.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-v4p8-mg3p-g94g</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2599 — LiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpoints</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2599</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the `command`, `args`, and `env` fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. Both test endpoints now require the `PROXY_ADMIN` role, bringing them into line with the save endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, developers should block `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` at their reverse proxy or API gateway.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the `command`, `args`, and `env` fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. Both test endpoints now require the `PROXY_ADMIN` role, bringing them into line with the save endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, developers should block `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` at their reverse proxy or API gateway.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2599</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
