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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-33155 — DeepDiff has Memory Exhaustion DoS through SAFE_TO_IMPORT</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-33155</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; seperman deepdiff&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DeepDiff is a project focused on Deep Difference and search of any Python data. From version 5.0.0 to before version 8.6.2, the pickle unpickler _RestrictedUnpickler validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in SAFE_TO_IMPORT have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (builtins.bytes, builtins.list, builtins.range). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call pickle_load with untrusted data. This issue has been patched in version 8.6.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; seperman deepdiff&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DeepDiff is a project focused on Deep Difference and search of any Python data. From version 5.0.0 to before version 8.6.2, the pickle unpickler _RestrictedUnpickler validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in SAFE_TO_IMPORT have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (builtins.bytes, builtins.list, builtins.range). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call pickle_load with untrusted data. This issue has been patched in version 8.6.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-33155</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-54jj-px8x-5w5q — DeepDiff has Memory Exhaustion DoS through SAFE_TO_IMPORT</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-54jj-px8x-5w5q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: deepdiff&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pickle unpickler `_RestrictedUnpickler` validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (`builtins.bytes`, `builtins.list`, `builtins.range`). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call `pickle_load` with untrusted data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2025-58367 hardened the delta class against pollution and remote code execution by converting `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to a `frozenset` and blocking traversal. `_RestrictedUnpickler.find_class` only gates which classes can be loaded. It doesn&amp;#39;t intercept `REDUCE` opcodes or validate what is passed to constructors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It can be exploited in 2 ways.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1 - During `pickle_load`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pickle that calls `bytes(N)` using opcodes permitted by the allowlist. The allocation happens during deserialization and before the delta processes anything. The restricted unpickler does not override `load_reduce` so any allowed class can be called.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
GLOBAL builtins.bytes      (passes find_class check — serialization.py:353)
INT    10000000000          (10 billion)
TUPLE + REDUCE             → bytes(10**10) → allocates ~9.3 GB
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2 - During delta application**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A valid diff dict that first sets a value to a large int via `values_changed`, then converts it to bytes via `type_changes`. It works because `_do_values_changed()` runs before `_do_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: deepdiff&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pickle unpickler `_RestrictedUnpickler` validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (`builtins.bytes`, `builtins.list`, `builtins.range`). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call `pickle_load` with untrusted data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2025-58367 hardened the delta class against pollution and remote code execution by converting `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to a `frozenset` and blocking traversal. `_RestrictedUnpickler.find_class` only gates which classes can be loaded. It doesn&amp;#39;t intercept `REDUCE` opcodes or validate what is passed to constructors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It can be exploited in 2 ways.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1 - During `pickle_load`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pickle that calls `bytes(N)` using opcodes permitted by the allowlist. The allocation happens during deserialization and before the delta processes anything. The restricted unpickler does not override `load_reduce` so any allowed class can be called.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
GLOBAL builtins.bytes      (passes find_class check — serialization.py:353)
INT    10000000000          (10 billion)
TUPLE + REDUCE             → bytes(10**10) → allocates ~9.3 GB
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2 - During delta application**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A valid diff dict that first sets a value to a large int via `values_changed`, then converts it to bytes via `type_changes`. It works because `_do_values_changed()` runs before `_do_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-54jj-px8x-5w5q</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2445 — DeepDiff has Memory Exhaustion DoS through SAFE_TO_IMPORT</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2445</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: deepdiff&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pickle unpickler `_RestrictedUnpickler` validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (`builtins.bytes`, `builtins.list`, `builtins.range`). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call `pickle_load` with untrusted data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2025-58367 hardened the delta class against pollution and remote code execution by converting `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to a `frozenset` and blocking traversal. `_RestrictedUnpickler.find_class` only gates which classes can be loaded. It doesn&amp;#39;t intercept `REDUCE` opcodes or validate what is passed to constructors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It can be exploited in 2 ways.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1 - During `pickle_load`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pickle that calls `bytes(N)` using opcodes permitted by the allowlist. The allocation happens during deserialization and before the delta processes anything. The restricted unpickler does not override `load_reduce` so any allowed class can be called.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
GLOBAL builtins.bytes      (passes find_class check — serialization.py:353)
INT    10000000000          (10 billion)
TUPLE + REDUCE             → bytes(10**10) → allocates ~9.3 GB
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2 - During delta application**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A valid diff dict that first sets a value to a large int via `values_changed`, then converts it to bytes via `type_changes`. It works because `_do_values_changed()` runs before `_do_…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: deepdiff&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pickle unpickler `_RestrictedUnpickler` validates which classes can be loaded but does not limit their constructor arguments. A few of the types in `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` have constructors that allocate memory proportional to their input (`builtins.bytes`, `builtins.list`, `builtins.range`). A 40-byte pickle payload can force 10+ GB of memory, which crashes applications that load delta objects or call `pickle_load` with untrusted data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2025-58367 hardened the delta class against pollution and remote code execution by converting `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to a `frozenset` and blocking traversal. `_RestrictedUnpickler.find_class` only gates which classes can be loaded. It doesn&amp;#39;t intercept `REDUCE` opcodes or validate what is passed to constructors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It can be exploited in 2 ways.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1 - During `pickle_load`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pickle that calls `bytes(N)` using opcodes permitted by the allowlist. The allocation happens during deserialization and before the delta processes anything. The restricted unpickler does not override `load_reduce` so any allowed class can be called.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
GLOBAL builtins.bytes      (passes find_class check — serialization.py:353)
INT    10000000000          (10 billion)
TUPLE + REDUCE             → bytes(10**10) → allocates ~9.3 GB
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2 - During delta application**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A valid diff dict that first sets a value to a large int via `values_changed`, then converts it to bytes via `type_changes`. It works because `_do_values_changed()` runs before `_do_…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2445</guid>
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