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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 14:17:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-23949 — jaraco.context Has a Path Traversal Vulnerability</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-23949</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jaraco.context&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jaraco.context, an open-source software package that provides some useful decorators and context managers, has a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the `jaraco.context.tarball()` function starting in version 5.2.0 and prior to version 6.1.0. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed. The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`. Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`. Version 6.1.0 contains a patch for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jaraco.context&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jaraco.context, an open-source software package that provides some useful decorators and context managers, has a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the `jaraco.context.tarball()` function starting in version 5.2.0 and prior to version 6.1.0. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed. The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`. Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`. Version 6.1.0 contains a patch for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-23949</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-58pv-8j8x-9vj2 — jaraco.context Has a Path Traversal Vulnerability</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-58pv-8j8x-9vj2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jaraco.context&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
There is a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the jaraco.context package affecting setuptools as well, in `jaraco.context.tarball()` function. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed.
The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`.
Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code can be found:
- https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/__init__.py#L74-L91
- https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76 (inherited)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This report was also sent to setuptools maintainers and they asked some questions regarding this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The lengthy answer is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability seems to be the `strip_first_component` filter function, not the tarball function itself and has the same behavior on any tested Python version locally (from 11 to 14, as I noticed that there is a backports conditional for the tarball).
The stock tarball for Python 3.12+ is considered not vulnerable (until proven otherwise 😄) but here the custom filter seems to overwrite the native filtering…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jaraco.context&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
There is a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the jaraco.context package affecting setuptools as well, in `jaraco.context.tarball()` function. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed.
The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`.
Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code can be found:
- https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/__init__.py#L74-L91
- https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76 (inherited)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This report was also sent to setuptools maintainers and they asked some questions regarding this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The lengthy answer is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability seems to be the `strip_first_component` filter function, not the tarball function itself and has the same behavior on any tested Python version locally (from 11 to 14, as I noticed that there is a backports conditional for the tarball).
The stock tarball for Python 3.12+ is considered not vulnerable (until proven otherwise 😄) but here the custom filter seems to overwrite the native filtering…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-58pv-8j8x-9vj2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-1469 — jaraco.context Has a Path Traversal Vulnerability</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-1469</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jaraco-context&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
There is a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the jaraco.context package affecting setuptools as well, in `jaraco.context.tarball()` function. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed.
The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`.
Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code can be found:
- https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/__init__.py#L74-L91
- https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76 (inherited)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This report was also sent to setuptools maintainers and they asked some questions regarding this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The lengthy answer is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability seems to be the `strip_first_component` filter function, not the tarball function itself and has the same behavior on any tested Python version locally (from 11 to 14, as I noticed that there is a backports conditional for the tarball).
The stock tarball for Python 3.12+ is considered not vulnerable (until proven otherwise 😄) but here the custom filter seems to overwrite the native filtering…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jaraco-context&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
There is a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the jaraco.context package affecting setuptools as well, in `jaraco.context.tarball()` function. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed.
The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`.
Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The code can be found:
- https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/__init__.py#L74-L91
- https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76 (inherited)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This report was also sent to setuptools maintainers and they asked some questions regarding this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The lengthy answer is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability seems to be the `strip_first_component` filter function, not the tarball function itself and has the same behavior on any tested Python version locally (from 11 to 14, as I noticed that there is a backports conditional for the tarball).
The stock tarball for Python 3.12+ is considered not vulnerable (until proven otherwise 😄) but here the custom filter seems to overwrite the native filtering…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-1469</guid>
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